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Compiling your Xcode project for localizers

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2009-03-09T12:00:35+01:00

If like with our projects you have a team of localizers translating your applications then -- unless your project is open source -- your localizers need to be able to open your NIB files. This article describes how to setup Xcode 3 to compile for your localizers.

Converting NIB files to XIB

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2008-12-09T18:57:44+01:00

Learn how to quickly convert Interface Builder NIB files to the new XIB format.

Creating a drop shadow in Inkscape

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T18:50:05+01:00

Learn how to spice up your Inkscape drawings with a fancy drop shadow.

Creating a 3D effect in Inkscape

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T18:34:52+01:00

Learn how to create a nifty 3D effect on Inkscape drawings

Escaping HTML from the command line

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T16:43:26+01:00

Learn how to escape HTML entities from the Unix command line.

SSH: save time with host shortcuts

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T15:37:51+01:00

If you work with SSH a lot from the command line then repeatedly typing in full hostnames can be cumbersome and tiring. In this quick post I'll show you how to setup up hostname shortcuts to save you time on the command line.

Let's assume you have a host painstakingly called luke-skywalker@deathstar.com then by adding the following to your ~/.ssh/config (you may have to create it first):

  Host luke
    HostName luke-skywalker@deathstar.com

Now the next time you want to connect all you have to type is:
$ ssh luke
This hostname expansion works for all commands in ssh family, including sftp and scp. It also works for programs that use ssh to connect remotely, including rsync, cvs and subversion.

SSH: login without a password

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T15:26:31+01:00

WARNING: logging in without a password is highly convenient but anybody with access to your workstation with this enabled can log in to your server, so make sure your workstations is adequately secured!

First, on the client side create the private and public keys

$ ssh-keygen -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa -N "" -t rsa
This creates two files: id_rsa and id_rsa.pub in $HOME/.ssh. The file id_rsa is the private key, and the file id_rsa.pub is the public key.

Note that the -N "" option tells ssh not to create a passphrase, and the -t option specifies the type as "rsa".

And second, upload the public key file (id_rsa.pub) to the server and append it to the to the authorised keys file
$ cat $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh you@server 'cat - >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys'
If you get an error message then please make sure the ~/.ssh directory exists on your server.

SSH port forwarding made easy

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T15:22:11+01:00

To forward a port on your local machine to that of a remote machine:
$ ssh -f -N -L [local port]:[remote host]:[remote port] [forward host]
This forwards traffic destined for [local port] on the local host to [remote port] at [remote host] via [forward host].

For example, if you are behind a firewall that blocks the CVSup port (5999) you can circumvent the firewall with:
$ ssh -f -N -L 5999:cvsup.at.freebsd.org:5999 tunnel.example.org
This forwards traffic destined for port 5999 on the localhost to port 5999 at cvsup.at.freebsd.org via tunnel.example.org

Another, probably more common example is when you want to tunnel your mail over an encrypted channel. For POP3 the tunnel command is:
$ ssh -f -N -L 110:mail.somewhere.com:110 localhost
For IMAP replace 110 with 143.

The above tunnel assumes that you have an account on mail.somewhere.com and that port 110 is not blocked by your firewall.

Calculating the difference between text strings in Ruby

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T00:40:43+01:00

The wonderful diff tool in Unix allows us to compare two or more text files for changes. This article will show you how to achieve the same effect and explain how to calculate the difference between text strings programmatically in Ruby

Since we don't want to reinvent the wheel but rather show you how to spin the wheel the first thing to do is to download Algorithm:Diff and unpack it in your project directory.

In Ruby you can then load this module with

   require "algorithm/diff"

To calculate the difference between two strings:

   diffs = "Hello world!".diff("hello world!")

You can patch the original string with these differences:

   "Hello world!".patch(diffs)
   => "hello world!"

Tip for FreeBSD users: the diff module is available in the ports collection:

 $ cd /usr/ports/textproc/ruby-diff
 $ make install clean

How to merge PostScript files

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T00:36:14+01:00

Merging multiple PostScript files

The easiest way to merge two or more PostScript files is to simply concatenate them:

   $ cat intro.ps main.ps conclusion.ps > report.ps

To sanitise the resulting PostScript file, run

   $ fixps report.ps

Note: there is a tool psmerge, although I haven't got this to work.

Ruby on rails: quick tips

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-12-17T00:15:39+01:00

5 great tips when working with Ruby on Rails: guidelines on working with views, accessing controller and action names, dumping tables to YAML, instantiated fixtures, and simple CAPTCHAs.

Gimp fade out effect

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-11-23T16:12:47+01:00

Learn how to create a fade-out effect on images with The Gimp.

How to test a Mac universal binary on Intel

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-10-26T14:33:00+02:00

If you're developing a Mac application as a universal binary on an Intel platform, then a quick way to test whether it runs on PowerPC/PPC is by forcing it to launch with Rosetta.

Here's how:

Select your application icon
Click "File" -> "Get Info"
Tick the "Open using Rosetta" tickbox
Close the info dialog
Launch your application

This is a quick and dirty way to test a universal binary, especially useful if you're on a tight budget. However, ultimately the only way to be 100% certain your universal binary runs on a specific platform is to run it on that platform.

Tip: you can also launch Rosetta from the command-line with the translate command. For example this is how we test iArchiver on our Intels:

  $ /usr/libexec/oah/translate \
     /Applications/iArchiver.app/Contents/MacOS/iArchiver

The Road to World War II: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-17T19:14:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._In August 1939, Germany and Russia shocked the Western powers by signing an agreement that finally swayed the balance of power in Germany's favour.The agreement, known as the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact",[1] set down the following terms:* In the official terms the parties agreed on a 10-year non-aggression pact – benevolent neutrality in the case of war* In the secret clauses Poland was to be divided into spheres of influence between the two countriesh2. Stalin's motivesAlthough the Pact surprised many, Stalin felt it in many way to be his only choice in securing the Soviet Union:* he distrusted the Western democracies just as much as he did Hitler, but their handling of the Munich agreement and the Czech crisis convinced him that they were to weak to offer any security* the negotiations by these powers with the Soviet Union were only half-hearted (inexperienced junior officials were sent)* it gave Stalin the vital time to prepare re-armament and re-organise the army, which had suffered under the purges, and* it avoided a two-front war with Japan, which was growing more and more a threat.h2. Hitler's motivesWhether Hitler would attack Poland was dependent on the role the Soviet Union would take. He thus required Soviet neutrality, which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact offered. With the pact he also avoided a two-front war with France and Britain in the West and the Soviet Union in the East.h2. ConsequencesThe Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact effectively made an attack on Poland inevitable, as Hitler was now convinced that, with the Soviet Union remaining neutral, Britain and France would not risk a general war.fn1. Respectively named after the Soviet and German foreign ministers that negotiated the deal

The Road to World War II: The Pact of Steel

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-12T10:56:05+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._Unlike the "Rome-Berlin Axis":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-rome-berlin-axis, the Pact of Steel was an offensive, military alliance, in which Hitler and Mussolini committed to fight together in case of war. Italy, though, would not have to fight before 1942.As a result the military lines were drawn, Europe was divided into two camps. The Pact of Steel set down the war time alliance.The Soviet Union was now the critical power. It was not yet in any of the camps and was in a position to tip the scales of power in either direction. Hitler was once again swift to act and pushed for the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-molotov-ribbentrop-pact -- the alliance between Germany and Russian that made war with Poland inevitable.

The Road to World War II: The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-10T12:23:45+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._Czechoslovakia was one of the many newly created states after Versailles, formed from parts of the former Habsburg and Romanov Empires. However, it was nevertheless a state of minority groups - in particular three million German speaking people, who no longer enjoyed the privileges as under the Habsburg rule. This area, the "Sudetenland", was given to Czechoslovakia after Versailles as it provided a natural, defensive frontier and vital for the countries industry. Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Party, set unacceptable demands to Czechoslovakia and provoked unsuccessful uprisings - this provoked Britain and France to act.h2. What did Hitler want, and why?Hitler hated Czechoslovakia because it was born out of Versailles; he believed that Czechoslovakia was in the way of his eastward expansion - especially the natural and easily defendable frontiers, the well-equipped army and the fact that she enjoyed diplomatic treaties with France and the Soviet Union (a problem, though, was that neither of these countries bordered her). In addition, he desired to united the German-speaking people into the Reich, gain the valuable resources in that area and to revise Versailles even further.h2. The annexation of the Sudetenlandh3. Meetings before MunichDuring the meetings at Berchtesgarden (September 15) and Bad Godesberg (September 22), Hitler clarified his intention of annexing the Sudetenland to Chamberlain. He also threatened with military occupation. At five minutes to twelve, literally speaking, Mussolini proposed a four-power meeting at Munich - with him as the arbitrator.h3. Should Hitler be granted his demands? Arguments for appeasementAlthough in retrospect "appeasement" has often been heavily criticised, there were arguments in favour of this policy:* the wide-spread horror of war* British understanding of Germany undoing the "wrongs" of Versailles* the belief that Germany could act as a bulwark against communism* economic considerations - the uncertainty of US financial support and the concerning the costs of war* strategic considerations - could the British Empire survive a major war? After all, Italy and Japan were counted as enemies too).h3. The Munich ConferenceWithout the consultation of Czechoslovakia, who had no choice but to accept the demands or else fight alone, the following agreements were reached at the Munich Conference[1]* Germany was allowed to annex the Sudetenland, the occupation would occur within ten days* Czechoslovakia had to cede large industrial areas, vital fortifications and communications to Germany* "Peace in our Time" - Hitler agreed that this had been his last demand and that, in future, force would no longer be used to solve disputes between two countriesh3. Arguments that justified the Munich AgreementFirstly, it was supported by public opinion, especially in Britain. Secondly, Britain was unprepared for a major war - with this concession, she was able to gain more time (significant time, in hindsight) to re-arm. Lastly, it was the "last chance" for Hitler, any further demands would result in a world-wide condemnation.h3. Arguments brought forward by the anti-appeaser"An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile - hoping it will eat him last," commented Winston Churchill. Against the Munich agreement spoke that a) the natures of Nazism and Hitler were such that they would continue to conquest, b) Munich would encourage Hitler to take further risks (as with the rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland), c) militarily Hitler could have been resisted, and d) it meant a major betrayal of Czechoslovakia.h3. ConsequencesThe most profound effect on Hitler was that he was more than ever convinced that Britain and France were unwilling to act - this encouraged him to take further risks, as later, the invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Yet also, it gave Britain and France the literally speaking "air to breath", that is, time for re-armament. h2. The destruction of Czechoslovakia - German occupation (March 1939)Although Hitler had managed to gain the Sudetenland, he had failed to destroy Czechoslovakia altogether, as he had aimed to do. When the Czechs, however, sent in their army to suppress a Slovakian uprising (which was, not surprisingly, stirred up by Nazis), it gave the necessary justification for Hitler to act - he invaded Czechoslovakia under the pretext of restoring order.h3. ConsequencesThe invasion of Czechoslovakia was a turning point. Hitler could no longer claim to be undoing a wrong of Versailles, neither was it an integration of German-speaking people into the Reich - rather, the occupation represented an aggressive expansion into the East ("Lebensraum").France and Britain were now convinced that Hitler could not be trusted and that he planned to dominate Eastern Europe. They reaslised that appeasement had failed. They could no longer aside and watch.Any further concessions to Hilter would titl the European power balance, and military preparations were hastily made. Significantly, Britain introduced conscription for the first time ever during times of peace.Britain and France knew that the next obvious target for Hitler was Poland, and gave immediate guarantees to Poland in case of an attack in March 1939.Mussolini, impressed by Hitler's success in invading Czechoslovakia, followed suit and invaded Albania[2]. The most likely next targets were Greece and Romania, and Britain and France extended their guarantees to these two countries in April 1939.Britain and France realised that appeasement had failed. They could no longer stand aside and watch the balance of power tilt any further towards the Fascist powers. Further expansions had to be contained.fn1. September 29-30, 1938fn2. April 1939

The Road to World War II: The Anschluss of Austria

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-05T19:02:42+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._Alarmed by recent activities of Austrian Nazis in early 1938, the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg[1], requested a meeting with Hitler. Knowing he could score an easy diplomatic victory, Hitler coerced Schuschnigg to include Nazis into his cabinet and to align Austrian foreign policy closer to his own.Feeling the rope tighten around Austria's neck, Schuschnigg attempted to dislodge himself from Hitler and regain control. In a speech to the Bundestag he urged to put an end to the concessions "where we must call a halt and say: This far and no further". Schuschnigg called for a plebiscite to vote on Austria's autonomy.In a well-coordinated move, Austrian Nazis seized state institutions in Vienna on March 11. Hitler acted swiftly and invaded Austria the next day.h2. Hitler's motivesHitler was Austrian by birth. His aim to incorporate Austria into the Third Reich he had set down as early as 1924 in "Mein Kampf". Furthermore, German strength could be further increased and the Versailles Treaty likewise be revised, as the "Anschluss" with Austria of any kind was forbidden.h2. Why did the invasion succeed?The major difference between 1938 and 1934 was that Mussolini did this time not intervene in Germany's invasion. The turning of the tide came with the "Rome-Berlin Axis":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-rome-berlin-axis after which Mussolini succumbed to Hitler's influence.Britain and France continued their policy of appeasement and were not prepared to go to war over Austria. Britain especially convinced itself that after all it contained German-speaking people and that they were entitled to self-determination.h2. ConsequencesFor Hitler, his successful invasion of Austrian without international objection* further revised the Treaty of Versailles was further in Germany's favour* convinced Hitler that Britain and France would not stop him in his effortsOn an international level, Hitler had used force for the first time against an, independent, sovereign state, and was now in a position to "threaten Czechoslovakia":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-invasion-of-czechoslovakia.fn1. He followed Dollfuss after "his assasination":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-assasination-of-dollfuss

The Road to World War II: The Rome-Berlin Axis

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-04T15:43:07+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._The Rome-Berlin Axis[1] was not a military agreement. Rather, it was a mutual condemnation of the League of Nations and an understanding over common foreign policies, covering Austria, Abyssinia and Spain.h2. Mussolini's motivesItaly was politically isolated after a) her invasion of Abyssinia and b) her involvement with Nazi Germany in the Spanish Civil War. The latter had also weakened her until then good relations with the Soviet Union. With the agreement Mussolini hoped to steer Italy out of political isolation.h2. Hitler's motivesMussolini's resistance of Hitler's invasion of Austria following the "assasination of Dollfuss":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-assasination-of-dollfuss convinced Hitler that he needed Italian support for his plans to annex Austria.Also Hitler was in need of an ally in Europe to keep his back free from Britain and France. Mussolini and his Fascist Italy were a natural ideological ally and Hitler wanted to draw Mussolini closer to Nazi Germany and align him with German policies.h2. ConsequencesWith Italian blessing, Hitler was now free to annex Austria. With Italian backing, he could now do so without worrying about international resistance -- Britian and France as he guessed rightly would yet again be unwilling to act.In addition, it meant a reverse of Italian-German relations. Up until then it was Hitler that following Mussolini, for example when he tried to emulate Mussolini's coup d'état with his "Beer Hall Putsch", or when he backed down under Mussolini's pressure after the "assasination of Dollfuss":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-assasination-of-dollfuss.Roles were now reversed: from now on Hitler would lead and Mussolini follow. This manifested itself in* continued Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War* Italy joining the "Anti-Comintern Pact" (with Japan, 1937) and her departure from the League of Nations (1937)Also, the "Rome-Berlin Axis" paved the way for the "Pact of Steel" – the military understanding that eventually resulted in the wartime alliance.fn1. October 1936

The Road to World War II: The Spanish Civil War

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-01T13:41:32+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._h2. Foreign involvement* Germany sent in planes ("Condor Legion") and some 6,000 troops - these significantly helped Franco in shifting his troops onto Spanish mainland (the sea route had been blocked by the Republicans)* Mussolini sent in some 70,000 troops (surprisingly not very effective, though)* France and Britain decided on a policy of "non-intervention"* Stalin sent in supplies and arms to the Republicansh2. Why did Hitler get involved? German motivesHitler profited from Germany's involvement in more than one way:* it distracted international attention from his re-armament programme* he hoped to gain valuable resources from Spain in return - possibly even be allowed to station submarines in Spain during war time* it provided the opportunity to test his "Luftwaffe" (viz. the bombing of Guernica)* it would commit Mussolini to mutual assistance, binding him closer to Germany.h2. Why did Mussolini get involved? Italian motivesMussolini essentially aimed to find a new ally in Franco and Spain and to show Italian might and strengthen her international position.h2. Why did France and Britain not get involved?For France and Britain, where the public was anyhow already polarised between left and right support, the policy of "non-intervention" was the only possibility to avoid domestic chaos.Desperate to uphold the Versailles Treaty, they also feared that by intervening the war might spill over into the whole of Europe - a war they were not prepared for - and they did not want Mussolini to be further pushed into Hitler's arms.h2. ConsequencesForeign (non-)involvement in the Spanish Civil War* diverted attention from Hitler's re-armament programme* divided Europe into two camps - left and right* convinced Stalin that the Western democracies were too weak to act (which was, amongst others, a reason why Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact).

The Road to World War II: The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-27T02:05:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._The final blow to international law and order[1], and hence the credibility of the League of Nations, came with the long-expected Italian invasion of Abyssinia[2].The League of Nations reacted with sanctions, but refused to include a decisive sanction on oil, which would have forced Mussolini to retreat, in fear of driving Mussolini into Hitler's arms. More destructive was the "Hoare-Laval Plan" (named after the British and French prime ministers) in which Italy would be awarded two-thirds of Abysinnia, of which the League wasn't even informed. The public outcry when plan was leaked forced Hoare to resign but it was too late to repair the damage to the League.The invasion of Abyssinia was _the_ turning point in international relations before the Second World War. On a level of international and collective security it meant that* the League of Nations was irreperably discredited in her role as a peacekeeper and Hitler was given further evidence that Britain and France were unwilling to act* the recently created "Stresa Front", and with it the attempt to collectively contain Hitler, was destroyed* showed Mussolini's preparedness (as later Hitler) to use force in order to achieve foreign policy aims, and the reluctance of Britain and France to thwart an aggressorIn the aftermath of the invasion Mussolini felt increasingly isolated. Whether this feeling was justified or unfounded, Hitler scented the occasion and exploited Mussolini's feeling of isolation to align Italy with his own plans. This would lead to the Rome-Berlin Axis and later the war-time alliance between Germany and Italy[2].Italy also consequently abandoned her resistance of German domination over Austria as she had done after "the assasination of Dollfuss":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-assasination-of-dollfuss. The stage was set for a "German annexation of Austria":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-anschluss-of-austria.fn1. The walls of international law and order had already started crumbling after the "Japanese invasion of Manchuria":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-japanese-invasion-of-manchuriafn1. October 1935fn2. The _Pact of Steel_

The Road to World War II: The Failure to Contain Hitler

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-25T05:01:23+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._h2. Hitler announces German rearmamentIn March 1935, Hitler openly defied the victors of the First of World. He bluntly declared that he had re-introduced conscription, enlared the standing army and ordered to build an air force.Hitler was bluffing, shrewdly but carefully testing the water temperature to see how the other powers would react.His bluff was not called. Although there were protests from Paris, it became clear that neither Britain nor France were prepared to risk a war, however slight the chance.Hitler's success had a profound impact on his attitude. He had for the first time unabashedly broken the Treaty of Versailles. The meek reactions by Britain and France foreshadowed the "appeasement policy" that would follow and convinced Hitler to continue his line.h2. The Stresa FrontAlthough the victors of World War I failed to call Hitler's bluff, they did not sit idle. Shocked into action by the pace of Hitler's rearmament, Britain, France and Italy signed the Stresa Front[1] in which they condemned German rearmament and agreed to resist future German breaches of the Treaty of Versailles.Although the "Stresa Front" marked the first real attempt to stop and contain Hitler, it was soon rendered ineffective, first by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement only to be fully destroyed by the the "Italian Invasion of Abyssinia":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-italian-invasion-of-abyssinia.h2. Alliance between France and the Soviet UnionIn fear of the German expansion, the Soviet Union become more involved in European affairs: in 1934, she joined the League of Nations and in May 1935 signed a defensive alliance with France, guaranteeing mutual assistance (for five years) in case of an unprovoked attack.The Treaty marked an attempt by both parties to isolate Germany and keep her in check.h2. Anglo-German Naval AgreementHitler, after the "Stresa Front", was eager to convince the other powers of his peaceful intentions and proposed a naval agreement to Britain, designed to guarantee British naval superiorty by fixing the ratio of the German navy to the British navy at of 35:100[2].British hopes in the agreement were to keep the German navy in check and to avoid a repeat of the "Anglo-German naval race":/articles/2006/12/28/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-anglo-german-naval-race that contributed it's part to the First World War.To Hitler, the agreement brought two advantages: it a) meant a next step to re-armament and the re-gaining of German strength, and this in accord with Britain, and b) concluded a further revision of Versailles, which had severely reduced Germany's navy.As Hitler had hoped, the agreement resulted in a) the Treaty of Versailles to be further revised in Germany's favour – meaning also French fears that German re-armament would be further encouraged, and, more significantly, b) a severe breach of the recently created "Stresa Front" and thus an attempt to contain Germany had been undermined (the French had not been consulted prior!).h2. Re-militarisation of the RhinelandWhen Hitler ordered the re-militarisation of the Rhineland (1936), which had been made a de-militarised zone by the Treaty of Versailles, he was bluffing again.He banked on the French on over-estimating his troop strength but gave secret orders to retreat in case of a French attack. He also tested the waters carefully be sending in only light troops at first.Why re-militarise? To Hitler, re-militarising the Rhineland a) provided the next step to revise Versailles and b) secured that France could no longer back her Eastern European allies (Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union) by invading the Rhineland and thus crippling Germany.Why did the British and French not intervene? Public opinion in Britain was very much in favour of Hitler undoing the "wrongs" of Versailles – after all, it was believed, he was simply walking into his "back garden". France was unwilling, and unable, to act without British support.Apart from being a clear violation of the Locarno Treaty[3], the re-militarisation encouraged Hitler further to revise the Treaty of Versailles. Once again, his bluff was not called. The policy of appeasement continued to steer the continent into a war.fn1. April 1935fn2. June 1935fn3. Signed in 1925 in which Germany confirmed the de-militarised Rhineland agreed by the Treaty of Versailles

The Road to World War II: The Assasination of Dollfuss

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-22T18:21:06+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._An opportunity to invade Austria and to fulfill his long-lost dream of incorporating his counry of birth into the Reich, arose when Dollfuss was assassinated by Austrian Nazis (1934).Dollfuss rose to power in 1932 in a fledgling state that was struggling to come to terms with its fate sealed under the Treaty of Versailles.Under heavy political fire from the Socialist Party on the left and the rapidly growing Austrian Nazi movement on the right, Dollfuss suspended parliament indefinetely in March 1933.Fearing the Nazis might win the next Austrian elections and merge Austria into the German Reich, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party in June 1933. To keep Austria's sovereignity he steered his country ever closer to Mussolini, and streamlined his policies to those of Fascist Italy in exchange for guarantees of Austria independence.Mussolini, who at this time did by no means have friendly relations with Germany, regarded Austria as a "buffer zone" between Italy and Germany and to keep it this way required an independent Austria.On July 25, 1934, eight Nazis entered the Chancellory building in Vienna and shot Dollfuss dead in an attempted Coup d'État. Hitlers involvement in the assasination remains unclear, but his reaction was swift: he immediately started to prepare an invasion of Austria under the pretext to "restore order".Mussolini, seeing his buffer zone threatened, called Hitler's bluff and mobilised his troops along the northern Italian border to Austria and himself threatened with invasion in case of a German attack. Hitler, knowing that his troops were not yet ready to sustain a war, backed down. Hitler's withdrawal was to be the last time that he followed Mussolini's footsteps, as he had done previously in his "remake" of Mussolini's "March to Rome" with his Munich "Beer Hall Putsch".The assasination would pave the way for the "Anschluss":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-anschluss-of-austria -- Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938.

The Road to World War II: German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-21T09:12:33+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._On January 26, 1934, Germany and Poland signed a non-aggression pact in which the two countries committed to forgo armed conflict for a period of ten years.The pact ended both the border disputes that arose in the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty, and an economically damaging custom's war.Hitler's motives for signing the pact were to* gain time for his re-armament programme and his "Lebensraum" expansion plans into the East* a public relations exercise to convince at home and abroad that his goals were peaceful* to shatter into pieces the French Eastern European security system that France had built in the 1920's against Germany[1]The pact was a success for Hitler as he fulfilled all his aims. He won valuable time for his re-armament program and expansion plans; the public was wooed into believing Hitler a man of peace; and, most importantly, the French security system, which had up until then provided a two-front protection against Germany, was destroyed.fn1. The Franco-Polish Military Alliance, signed February 1921 in Paris

The Road to World War II: Hitler withdraws Germany from the League of Nations

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-19T15:57:21+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._When Hitler became Chancellor there was no fundamental change in German foreign policy aims: the key factor remained the revision of the Versailles Treaty, an aim which the moderate Streseman and Hitler's predecessor, Brüning, had already initiated. What was different, though, was the pace at which Hitler proceeded.According to Alan Bullock, Hitler combined, "consistency of aim with complete opportunism in method and tactics." Whether Hitler desired to ignite a war remains disputed. Historians in favor base their arguments on the "Hossbach Memorandum", in which Hitler makes clear his intentions to invade Czechoslovakia and Austria even if it means risking war with England and France. But others like AJP Taylor dispel the Memorandum as "day dreaming, unrelated to what followed in real life," claiming that the aim of the meeting where the Memorandum was drafted had been to discuss the armaments programme, not foreign policy.More significant to the debate are the aims laid out by Hitler in his "Mein Kampf":* To relieve Germany of the burden of the Treaty of Versailles, implying the rearmament of Germany and reclaiming her international status* To unite all the German-speaking people (Sudetenland, Austria, Danzig in particular) and incorporate them into an overarching German Reich* To expand "Lebensraum", living space in the east (Ukraine and the Soviet Union), for the German people to liveAll these goals were outlawed by the Treaty of Versailles.Hitler's first step was to demand parity with the other European players at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. When France rejected this outright on grounds of fear of vulnerability in case of a German expansion. Inspired by Japanese defiance following the "invasion of Manchuria":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-japanese-invasion-of-manchuria, Hitler withdrew Germany from the Conference and the League of Nations (October 1933).

The Road to World War II: The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-16T20:40:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii ._The peacemakers of Versailles desired to erect an impregnable wall of international law and order that would perpetuate peace and prevent another Great War. With war-torn Europe longing for peace, this wall in the form of The League of Nations offered a ray of hope. It didn't take long, however, the walls took their first heavy blow with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931). A blow from which the League would never recover.h2. The Mukden incident and the Japanese invasion of ManchuriaWith self-confidence boosted from the overwhelming victory over Russia in the war of 1905 and Europe licking its wounds in the aftermath of World War I, expansionist Japan turned its eyes to nearby China. The perfect pretext for an invasion came with a bomb explosion near Mukden, along a railway the Japanese had a right to protect. The Japanese didn't hesitate to blame the Chinese and invaded.h2. ConsequencesThe invasion itself was a clear breach of everything the League of Nations stood for. But even more significant to the breakdown of international order than the actual invasion was League of Nation's failure to act. Instead, a commission (the "Lytton Commission") was sent to investigate. When the commission issued its report condemning Japan's invasion, Japan simply withdrew from the League of Nations (February 1933).The consequences of the League's unwillingness to act were far-reaching:* it marked the first breakdown of international law and order that the League of Nations was designed to upkeep* the position of the League of Nations as a peacekeeper was severely undermined - an aggressive power had successfully resisted the League* the idea of collective security was challenged as the major powers (Britain and France) were unwilling to actFatally to peace in Europe, this encouraged both Mussolini and Hitler to pursue an aggressive foreign policy as they were now convinced that they too would get away unchallenged.

The Road to World War II

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-15T22:46:30+01:00

Over the coming weeks we look at the steps that lead to the outbreak of World War II that begin with the thundering sound of the Blitzkrieg German invasion of Poland in September 1939.There are thousands of sites on the web, endless books written and miles of documentaries rolls filmed about this topic, so why this post?Most of the material you will find talks about what happened, but hardly touches upon _why_ it happened, and more significantly, _what the consequences were_. This post fills this gap.These are the steps that lead to the outbreak of World War II:* "The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-japanese-invasion-of-manchuria* "Hitler withdraws Germany from the League of Nations":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-hitler-withdraws-germany-from-the-league-of-nations* "German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-german-polish-non-aggression-pact* "The Assasination of Dollfuss":/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-assasination-of-dollfuss* "The Failure to Contain Hitler":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-failure-to-contain-hitler* "The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-italian-invasion-of-abyssinia* "The Spanish Civil War":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-spanish-civil-war* "The Rome-Berlin Axis":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-rome-berlin-axis* "The Anschluss of Austria":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-anschluss-of-austria* "The Invasion of Czechoslovakia":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-invasion-of-czechoslovakia* "The Pact of Steel":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-pact-of-steel* "The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact":/articles/2007/01/20/the-road-to-world-war-ii-the-molotov-ribbentrop-pactSee also:* "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i

The Road to World War I: The Second Moroccan Crisis

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-08T19:36:12+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. A new opportunity for GermanyIn May 1911, the French occupied Fez, a major city, to quell a rebellion against the Sultan and to protect European citizens in Morocco.h2. German ReactionsKaiser Wilhelm strongly protested, claiming the French were preparing to establish an overall protectorate. The gunboat "Panther" was sent to Agadir to object to French supremacy.h2. Germany’s intentionsThe opportunity was good to humiliate France and demonstrate German strength by claiming compensation for the French "take-over". By doing so, Britain could be made aware of her weak ally, France, especially as Anglo-Russian relations were already strained (due to colonial rivalries) and the "Triple Entente" seemed to be disintegrating. Possibly, Kaiser Wilhelm also had hopes of establishing a naval base in that area.h2. Subsequent TalksGerman demands for compensation in exchange for accepting French domination in Morocco were agreed upon. France was to have free hand and Morocco actually became a French protectorate (1912). Germany received parts of French Congo and two areas connecting the Cameroons to Congo and Ubangi.h2. ConsequencesThe arrival of the "Panther" threatened the British into believing a further expansion of the German navy in the form of a naval base and was also regarded as a very hostile act (especially for the British, who saw it as a direct threat for her colony at Gibraltar). Consequently, Anglo-German relations were gravely soured and actually furthered the already existing Naval Race.Thus, Anglo-French relations were further strengthened and now, for the first time, resulted in a military co-operation, the naval agreement in 1912 (by which the British would transfer her ships from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and French from Brest to the Mediterranean). Although it did not result in a formal alliance, it showed British awareness of a German threat.The Second Moroccan Crisis put an end to all hopes of improving Franco-German relations and France was now convinced that Germany was hostile towards her. It should be noted that, "there followed a distinct revival in nationalist feeling and hostility [in France] towards Germany. Despite their alliances, France never actually sought war with Germany, which they might have done in 1908 or 1911. However, between 1912 and 1914 extensive preparations were made. Military parades, […] were revived, the high command reorganised, military aircraft developed and, in 1913, the military protocol with Russia signed (by which both powers should mobilise if either were attack by Germany ‘without there being the need for preliminary agreement’)," (Wolfson). On the outbreak of war, thus, France had never been readier (though not for the type of warfare that followed).Furthermore, Germany suffered a severe diplomatic defeat, similar to the Russian one during the Bosnian Crisis, and would not be prepared to back down again. The crisis caused tension in Europe that was not removed until the outbreak of war.Subsequently, Italy, following the French principle, was eager to extend her own influence in North Africa and resulted in an unprovoked attack on the Turkish possession of Tripoli. Turkey was forced to stretch her resources and this provided an opportunity for the Balkan states to rid themselves of Turkish rule, hence the Balkan Wars.

The Road to World War I: The Bosnian Crisis

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-02-03T23:04:56+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. BackgroundSince 1878 Austria was allowed to govern the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Serbia, a pro-Russian government was elected in 1903, posing a first threat to Austrian hegemony over Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the "Young Turk" movement of 1908, the Sultan was overthrown, throwing the Turkish Empire in turmoil and diverting its attention from foreign to domestic issues.h2. Austrian attitudes towards BosniaThe Habsburg Empire faced a serious threat of disintegrating due to the rise of nationalism in the Balkans. At the same time, the Balkans were of key interest to Austria: increasing her own sphere of influence while simultaneously decreasing that of Russia was a key aim in foreign affairs.By annexing Bosnia Austria hoped to* extend her own sphere of influence in the Balkans* weaken Russia's influence in the region* humiliate Serbia and to choke her growing influence on Bosnia's Slav populationh2. Turkish attitudes towards BosniaAlthough the provinces were governed by Austria, they were technically speaking still part of the Turkish Empire. That Turkey had not abandoned these territories was shown by her invitation of Bosnian representatives to participate the new Turkish Parliament.h2. Russian attitudes towards BosniaThe Russians believed themselves the natural leaders of the Slav people. Similarly to Austria, Russia desired to increase her sphere of influence in the Balkans while containing that of Austria.h2. Serbian attitudes towards BosniaSerbia, who had gained independence from Turkish rule, was eager to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if not more of the Austrian Empire, herself.h2. The Annexation of Bosnia HerzegovinaBefore annexing the provinces, the Austrian Foreign Minister contacted his Russian counter-part, Izvolski. In a secret agreement, it was arranged that Russia would accept Austria’s annexation in exchange for Austrian support to Russia’s claim for a revision of the "Straits Convention" (so Russian warships could pass the Dardanelles which linked the Black Sea to the Mediterranean). Contrary to Izvolski’s expectations, this was not referred to in an international conference. Austria annexed Bosnia October 6, 1908.h2. Reactions to the annexationTurkey and Serbia were outraged and started to mobilise their forces. The Russian government denied knowledge and took Serbia’s side and started herself to mobilise. Consequently, Austria depended on her ally Germany, from which she received full support and an advice to take a "hard line". Russia, too weak to fight a war, backed down after a German threat. Serbia was alone and backed down too. An international meeting was held and the annexation confirmed. Turkey received two million pounds compensation for her losses.h2. ConsequencesThe annexation brought Austria’s conflict with Russia into the open made each power more determined to "win the next round". By supporting Austria-Hungary in the Bosnian Crisis, Germany showed that* she was prepared to mobilise and go to war if necessary for her ally, and * consequently get involved in Balkan affairs, hence clashing with Russia.The Russians suffered a grave diplomatic defeat, far greater than the ones suffered by Germany during the Moroccan Crises, and was determined not to be pushed around by Germany and Austria again. A further setback would have discredited her not only of her influence in the Balkans but also in front of her ally France, and consequently launched a programme of military re-construction.The annexation, contrary to Austria’s hopes, resulted in a further rise of nationalism. Serbia now openly supported South Slav opposition to the Habsburg Empire – best illustrated by the foundations of new terrorist organisations, such as the "Black Hand" in 1911, one of who's members would trigger the war by assassinating the Arch Duke of Austria in the Summer of 1914.

The Road to World War I: The First Moroccan Crisis

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-31T07:24:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. French attitudes towards MoroccoFrance was eager to secure its sphere of influence in North-west Africa and, since it already controlled neighbouring Algiers, had high hopes of seizing Morocco.h2. German attitudes towards MoroccoKaiser Wilhelm's "Weltpolitik" implied that Germany would a) want to press her own rights in Africa in general and Morocco in particular, and b) assert her rightful say in world affairs by being involved in decisions concerning Morocco.h2. BackgroundThe "Madrid Convention" of 1880 granted each power equal rights in Morocco. By the "Entente Cordial", however, the British accepted French rights in Morocco in exchange for French support to Britain's claims in Egypt.h2. The Kaiser pays a visitIn 1905, the Kaiser paid a visit to Tangier. To the French consulate he clarified that Germany expected rights in Morocco. In a public speech, he suggested that Morocco be an independent nation (protected by Germany).h2. German intentionsThe real motives for the Kaiser's actions are unclear. The Kaiser, with his "Weltpolitik", was eager to demonstrate that international questions could no longer be resolved without Germany. It should be noted that his visit took place during a period where the Russians were severely weakened by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and could hardly give effective support to her ally France. It is possible that Wilhelm wanted, by forcing France to give ground, to weaken and discredit her as an ally in the eyes of Great Britain and Russia.h2. Algeciras Conferences (1906)An international conference, attended by the major powers, was held at Algeciras to decide upon the future of Morocco. Germany relied on the "Madrid Convention" and expected an outcome in her favour. The result was much to the contrary of German expectations: all but for Austria-Hungary and Morocco voted in favour of the French claims to Morocco, now strengthened even more by her newly gained control over the Moroccan police.h2. ConsequencesTo Germany, it was a serious diplomatic defeat. On top of that, Germany believed to be surrounded by jealous and hostile neighbours pursuing a "policy of encirclement" ("Einkreisungspolitik"). From then on, Germany believed that international disputes could no longer be settled by meetings. Besides that, the German intentions to "crack" the "Entente Cordial" failed and Anglo-French relations as a matter of fact hardened. The Anglo-Russian co-operation eventually ended in an agreement (the "Triple Entente" in 1907), ending colonial rivalries in Southeast Asia.

The Road to World War I: The Anglo-German Naval Race

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-30T06:52:43+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. German attitudes towards the NavyKaiser Wilhelm's "Weltpolitik" implied that Germany would be made a world power. For this to be achieved, colonies and an expansion of the German Empire were necessary. In order to become a dominating world power, therefore, Wilhelm believed it essential to have a strong navy.h2. British attitudes towards the NavyOver the years, Great Britain had managed to expand its Empire throughout the globe. Due to a required protection of her colonial empire and, since Britain was an island with her colonies at far distance, it was believed that the safeguard of her world power status was dependant on her navy.h2. Naval Expansion_| Date | German naval expansion | British naval expansion ||Background|Admiral Tirpitz's "Risk Theory" (German fleet had to damage any attacker sufficiently to make it not worth risking a battle)|"Two Power Standard" [1889] issued (Royal Navy would always equal to the sum of the fleets of Britain's next two nearest rivals) ||1898 |First Navy Law passed (12 new battleships and some smaller ships added to the existing fleet)|n/a||1900 |Second Navy Law passed (38 battleships to be built over the next twenty years)|n/a||1903 ||New naval bases built at Rosyth, Ireland; parliament approves plans for the formation of a North Sea fleet||1906 (Feb) |n/a|Launching of the "Dreadnought" (with superior armament, greater range and higher speed) renders all German ships obsolete ||1906 (May) |Tonnage of ships under construction increased; six cruisers added to the building programme; plans issued to widen the Kiel canal to take "Dreadnought" type ships |n/a||1907 |"Rheinland" ships (similar to "Dreadnoughts") built |n/a||1908 |Navy Law amended (4 "Rheinlands" now to be built until 1911 instead of 3) |n/a||1909 |n/a|Britain alarmed by German fleet - 8 "Dreadnoughts" ordered to be built instead of 3 ||1912 (Mar) |Germany announces an increase in ships and men as well as the creation of third fleet in commission |n/a||1912 (Jul) |n/a|Franco-Russian naval convention and Anglo-French agreement (British ships to be transferred from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and French ships from Brest to the Mediterranean) |h2. Consequences of the Naval RaceThe expansion of the German fleet directly threatened the British Empire and soured Anglo-German relations severely. German intentions to "threaten" Britain into an alliance actually had the opposite effect by creating an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility, particularly in public opinion. The aftermath of the Second Moroccan Crisis (1911) had the consequence of poisoning the relations even further and resulted in a greater naval expansion. Tirpitz's "Risk Theory" was in effect diplomatic blackmail. The German expansion inevitably brought Britain closer to France and Russia, whereas she might have been a natural ally of Germany.

The Road to World War I: The Balkan Wars

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-25T21:14:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. The First Balkan WarAfter the Agadir Crisis in 1911, Italy, following the French principle, was eager to extend her own influence in North Africa. Her unprovoked attack on the Turkish area of Tripoli stretched Turkish resources. This provided an opportunity for the Balkan League (Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria), initially thought by Russia as a buffer against future expansions of Austria-Hungary, to rid themselves of Turkish rule. Turkey was soon driven out of her European possessions.h2. The Second Balkan WarThe peace agreements heaved upon the Balkan states by the world powers caused dissatisfaction. Serbia believed she had been deprived of her right to an Adriatic Coastline and that her share of Macedonia was inadequate. Greece thought similarly which lead to an alliance with Serbia. Bulgaria attacked Serbia (June 29 1913), resulting in a declaration of war of Greece, Romania and Turkey on Bulgaria. Bulgaria was soon defeated.h2. The emergence of SerbiaAs a direct result of the two wars, Serbia had greatly increased in size, some million and a half people in total. Her standing army now numbered 400,000 men.h2. Invasion of AlbaniaMotivated by her success and her desire for an Adriatic Coastline, Serbia invaded Albania (September 23, 1913). The Serbs, however, yielded to an Austrian ultimatum and withdrew.h2. ConsequencesThe emergence of Serbia as an even more powerful state was a "victory for Balkan nationalism," and a "disaster beyond remedy for the Habsburg monarchy" (Taylor).A further defeat could be ill be afforded by the Habsburgs if they wanted to keep the unity of their patchy empire in tact. Wilhelm, although initially indifferent to the Balkan Wars, encouraged his ally to take a firm position towards Serbia and declared his willingness to stand behind Austria, "[I] am ready to draw the sword whenever your action makes it necessary […] Whatever comes from Vienna is for me a command." Similarly France, who guaranteed Russia full support (given by President Poincaré during his visit to Moscow, August 1912) if a confrontation with Austria and Germany occurred. Clearly, the lines had been drawn: Austria was fully backed by Germany and Russia by France; Austrian and Russian prestige was at a law point and neither could afford a further (diplomatic) defeat. Only Great Britain and Italy had undecided positions by then.

The Road to World War I: French Foreign Policy

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-23T21:53:20+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. Colonial PolicyFrance pursued a very ambitious colonial policy. Although it has been suggested that this policy underlay a grande imperialistic strategy -- the need of an industrial country to expand its markets and secure its resources -- this provides more the justification for an unpopular policy (colonialism was not universally supported by the French public opinion) than an explanation of the actual motives. It is more likely that colonialism represented an extension of French nationalism, especially after the defeat in the war with Germany (1870-1871). It was hoped that expanding the Empire would restore pride and prestige, as well as show French greatness in dire times when European diplomacy was unfavourable to her. Interestingly Bismarck supported French colonialism, as this would distract France from wounded pride over Alsace-Lorraine and thus secure peace between Germany and France.The two main areas of interest to France were Southeast Asia and Northwest Africa (Algiers, Tunis and Morocco in particular). In Africa alone, France, during the years 1890-1910, had established and organised an Empire covering some three million square miles. In addition, considerable protectorates had been secured, for example Tonkin, China (1885). However, the achievements, as large as they may appear, should not be exaggerated - much of the land acquired was useless (as for example the Sahara Desert) or difficult to exploit for economic gain. In addition, few men and resources were invested in these areas: only some 10% of foreign investments went into the colonial Empire.French colonialism clashed both with British expansion (resulting nearly in a war during the "Fashoda Crisis" in 1898) and with Germany's "Weltpolitik" (exemplified by the two Moroccan Crises in 1905 and 1911). Significantly, while Anglo-French colonial disputes could be resolved and actually resulted in the wartime alliance, tensions between Germany and France increased after the both Moroccan Crises without being removed before the outbreak of war.h2. European PolicyThe main aim of French policy in Europe was "Revanche", i.e. the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (lost to Germany in 1871) needed to be regained, either by economic or military means.h3. France and RussiaHowever, France had been severely weakened by the war with Germany and thus needed a strong ally. This was made difficulty because a) the Bismarckian system of alliances kept France in political isolation and b) internal political differences and the humiliation suffered by the war with Germany had discredited her as an ally. Since a co-operation with Britain was unlikely (due to colonial rivalry), diplomatic relations with Russia were sought.The failure of Germany to renew the "Reinsurance Treaty" had left Russia, like France, in a state of isolation. After initial financial agreements beginning 1891 (French loans to Russia), military discussions began to take shape. The result was the "Franco-Russian Alliance" (1894), which was primarily a defensive agreement (by which Russia would provide 700,000 to 800,000 troops if France were attacked by Germany or Italy backed by Germany and similarly France would provide 1,300,000 men if Russia were attacked either Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany). Significantly, the ideological differences between autocratic Russia and republican France had been settled in view of the common enemy, Germany.The guarantees to Russia, especially concerning an Austrian attack, was henceforth likely to get France involved into Balkan affairs. In fact, the aftermath of the Balkan Wars showed France's willingness to support Russia (so she would not back down again) if a similar crisis occurred, which it did when Austria invaded Serbia. Yet, the alliance committed Russia to no action concerning Alsace-Lorraine, and it is highly unlikely that Russia would have backed France in her ambitions to regain these territories by force.h3. France and ItalyRelations with Italy had been brought to a low point after France established a protectorate over Tunis (1881), an area in which Italy itself had historic ambitions. This was marked by Italy's entry into the "Triple Alliance" (1882), which was primarily targeted at France. Yet, after the fall of the anti-French government as a consequence of the catastrophic disaster in Abyissinia (1896), disputes over Tunis diminished. France cleverly exploited this, and initial agreements over spheres of influence in Africa eventually resulted in an Italian guarantee to remain neutral if France were attacked by one of the other "Triple Alliance" members (1902).The impact of arrangements with Italy should not be exaggerated. After all, she was still a member of the "Triple Alliance" and the neutrality deal with France added another possibility to Italy's ambiguous position in European affairs.h3. "Rapprochement" with Great Britain"In 1898, for all her diplomatic success elsewhere, France stood on the verge of war with Great Britain over the Fashoda crisis. In subsequent years, French hostility to British policy in South Africa, and British hostility to the policy of France's great ally, Russia, in the Far East, scarcely promised warmer relations," (Morris). Errors in German diplomacy, once more, changed the situation in France's favour: "Germany's decision to enter into naval rivalry with Britain, her tactless support for the Boers, and Britain's own increased sense of isolation after the Boer War, all helped to provide a basis for an Anglo-French rapprochement," (Morris).They key for an Anglo-French understanding lay in settling colonial disputes, which resulted in the "Entente Cordial" (1904), whereby mutual concessions over influences in North Africa were agreed upon (France respected Britain's predominance in Egypt and Britain conceded a "free hand" to France in Morocco)."Rapprochement" meant a remarkable turn in Anglo-French relations - the archenemies had entered a new era of cordiality and new tensions between the powers did, notably, not arise until the outbreak of war.However, it should be noted that the agreement contained no military understandings whatsoever and subsequent military discussions led to no results. It was, furthermore, highly unlikely that Britain were to back France in her attempts to regain Alsace-Lorraine. It did, though, greatly improve Anglo-French relations. Indeed, it was Germany's growth combined with her imperialistic demands (as during the two Moroccan Crisis) and her continued naval expansion that furthered Anglo-French relations and eventually even drew Britain and Russia together, thereby creating the "Triple Entente" (1907).

The Road to World War I: German Foreign Policy

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-19T22:37:00+01:00

_This article is part of the series "The Road to World War I":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i ._h2. Foreign policy under Bismarckh3. Germany under BismarckFollowing the war with France (1870-1871), Bismarck was eager to keep France politically isolated to prevent her from a) re-capturing the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and b) creating the "nightmare coalition" (a Franco-Russian Alliance) that would force Germany to lead a two-front war. Colonial disputes made an Anglo-French agreement unlikely and consequently Bismarck sought relations with Russia and Austria-Hungary to secure peace in Europe.h3. The DreikaiserbundBismarck's policies lead to the "Dreikaiserbund" (1872) - primarily a defensive arrangement - by which any of the three powers would be given support if attacked by a fourth power.For Bismarck, it has been suggested, there were three motives to signing this treaty: it a) provided a natural front of conservative ideals against disruptive forces such as nationalism (from the Balkans) and socialism (from France), b) ensured that neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary would ally with France and c) "it's objective," A.J.P. Taylor wrote, "in so far as it had one, was to prevent a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Eastern question."The conclusion of the League of the Three Emperors, however, "gave a false air of stability to the politics of Eastern Europe. Behind its façade, a series of factors kept alive Russian resentment at rising German power and at Austria pretensions in the Balkans," (Morris). The "Congress of Berlin" (1878), which limited Russia from her gains in Turkey and gave Austria the right to govern the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, struck a blow to Russo-German relations and revealed the prevailing hostility between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. The measure of tension is best illustrated by the refusal of Alexander III (he regarded the Congress as, "a European coalition against Russia") to renew the "Dreikaiserbund" (April 1887).h3. The Dual AllianceIt was more the wounded pride and the rejection of Russian pan-slav ambitions after the Congress of Berlin that caused the Anti-German feeling in Russia rather than a re-orientation of German foreign policy.Bismarck's motives for signing the treaty are complex, yet he was a) faced with the threat of political isolation, b) hoped to frighten Russia back into better terms and c) certain that a commitment to Austria would be popular within Germany especially in times when Bismarck heavily relied on conservative support.The resulting "Dual Alliance" between Austria and Germany was essentially a defensive agreement by which either country would give full support to the other if attacked by Russia or a country aided by Russia, and at least remain neutral in case if either were attacked by any other power. Italy was added to this arrangement, thereby creating the "Triple Alliance" (1882), as she had felt threatened by the recent French invasion of Tunis and believed this the response to (future) French aggression.The understandings with Italy provided Germany for the first time with a committed ally against France. The arrangements with Austria, however, were now likely to get Germany involved into Balkan affairs, areas of no direct interests to her. This is exemplified by German intervention in the Bosnian Crisis (1908), the "Balkan Wars" (1912-1913) and, eventually, the war following the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand (1914).h3. The Reinsurance TreatyAfter Russia had forced the abdication of the independent-minded Bulgarian King Alexander (1886), a Russo-Austrian clash seemed more likely than ever and the "Dreikaiserbund" finally collapsed.With his policy at stake, Bismarck turned to Russia and concluded the secret "Reinsurance Treaty" (1887). Both powers agreed benevolent neutrality if attacked by a third power, provided Russia did not attack Austria (in which case Germany would be tied to her ally) or Germany attacked France.It has often been suggested that the "Reinsurance Treaty" was in fact incompatible with Germany's promises to Austria given in the "Dual Alliance". However, there was no contradiction between the terms of the two agreements. The two treaties, as a matter of fact, gave Germany the possibility to arbitrate in the event of a clash on who was truly the aggressor and whom she would support. Furthermore, it made a French attack improbable, as alone she would be in a too weak position to challenge Germany.h2. German Foreign Policy after Bismarckh3. The abandonment of the Reinsurance Treaty and the Franco-Russian AllianceKaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck had broken on the renewal of the "Reinsurance Treaty", which had guaranteed that a French re-capturing of Alsace-Lorraine could not become reality. To Bismarck, the treaty had provided a peace in Europe by the assurance of Russian and German neutrality. Wilhelm, however, believed a) the alliance was incompatible with the promises given to Austria in the "Dual Alliance", b) the Treaty terms gave more advantages to Russia than to Germany and c) that war in Europe would most likely be of Germany against France, or Russia against Austria - and in any case, Russia and Germany could not be on the same side.Consequently, the "Reinsurance Treaty", despite Russian offers, was not renewed (1890).The almost immediate consequence was a Franco-Russian economic understanding (1891) that eventually ended in the "nightmare coalition" Bismarck had so desparately sought to avoid -- the "Franco-Russian Alliance" (1894).This in turn meant that in the event of war, Germany would now need to fight on two fronts. This, in addition with the renewal of the "Triple Alliance" with Austria and Italy (1891) gave a, "substantial contribution to the formation of hostile camps in Europe that eventually undermined the peace," (Morris). Europe was thus now split into two camps, with only Britain left out of the alliance network.Furthermore, any Balkan affair was now likely to get both France and Germany involved. This is especially true of the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars - after which Russia only backed down after German intervention threats of mobilisation and France henceforth committed herself to support Russia - as well as the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, after which France and Germany committed themselves to support their allies.h3. European policyThe primary aim of German foreign policy in Europe was to manoeuvre the alliance system into her favour as this would a) give protection against a possible future attack of France and b) assure support in her ambitions for "Weltpolitik".Events in the nineteenth century, however, had shown that a) France would remain Germany's enemy and b) Austria her ally. Relations with Britain and Russia were thus of great significance.h3. Germany and RussiaEfforts were made to dislodge Russia from her alliance with France by keeping up friendly relations. Common action against recent Japanese gains from China during the 1890's seemed prosperous, but the consequent Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) let the damage done by the cancellation of the Reinsurance Treaty reappear (although the Russian distractions from European affairs due to the war suited Germany, it made Russia believe that it had been Germany's goal all along).In a meeting at Björkö (July 1905), the Kaiser persuaded the Tsar to sign a treaty which guaranteed mutual aid if either country were attacked by a second power. To Germany, it meant that she would be relieved of a two-war front and of a possible French attack; to Nicholas II it provided a chance to gain friends while his position at home was at stake (due to political unrest, i.e. the 1905 revolution).It was soon realised, however, that the treaties were incompatible to both Germany and Russia due to commitments to their respective allies, Austria and France. Russia proposed France to be excluded, yet, as this would in fact destroy the whole intention of the treaty (i.e. German intentions to dislodge Russia from France), it was never ratified.h3. Germany and BritainA response to the growing Russo-French menace would have been attempts to improve relations with Britain. Yet, the Kaiser's attitude to Britain remained, in a word, ambiguous. He both "loved and loathed" Britain, i.e. on the one hand he wanted a friendly relationship to Britain and on the other hand he desired to convince her people of his own countries strength.In 1896, for example, he sent a telegram to the Boer President, Kruger, and congratulated him on successfully defeating the Jameson Raid, "without for the help of friendly powers" This was, obviously, targeted at Britain and caused discontent in British public opinion. In a "Daily Telegraph" interview in 1908, on the other hand, Wilhelm gloated how he had actually helped the British defeat the Boers. Colonial agreements over Heligoland and East Africa (1890) contrasted to the Kaiser's proposal to Nicholas for a joined alliance against further British expansion (1897).This ambivalent attitude is probably explained by Wilhelm's intentions to show Britain how crucial Germany's friendship was for Britain's survival and thus "frighten" them into an alliance. Before 1900, this idea actually seemed to prosper: an Anglo-German colonial agreement was suggested (1898), but was rejected as Germany was a) worried it would stress relations with Russia for no reason and b) convinced that Britain was only seeking allies against Russian expansion in the Far East.After the turn of the century, British unpopularity over the Boer War (1899-1900) and German influence in Turkey made an Anglo-German unlikely. A second approach (January 1901) was rejected as Germany was in the belief that an alliance with her was Britain's only option and consequently set strict conditions on alliance: Britain was to tie herself not only to Germany but to the "Triple Alliance" as a whole. Britain rejected this proposal as she was unwilling to commit herself to the maintenance of Austria.Failure to reach agreement with Britain had significant impacts on German foreign policy.Given Italy's ambivalent role (after her guarantees to France to remain neutral if France were attacked by one of the other "Triple Alliance" members) and the formation of the "Triple Entente" (1907) between Britain, France and Russia, it meant that Germany was now wholly dependent on Austria as an ally. This in turn implied that she would henceforth be involved in Balkan disputes, as exemplified by the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars.The naval building remained the last effort to "force" Britain into a co-operation, and in fact had the opposite effect of irreparably souring Anglo-German relations and destroying possibilities of an agreement with a nation that might have been a natural ally of Germany.h3. Weltpolitik"Weltpolitik" was essentially a response to internal German developments. For one, the rapidly growing German industry and population left Germany in a state to decide whether to expand beyond her boundaries (and to secure industrial resources and markets) or to stagnate as a major power. Secondly, following the rapid growth of German economy combined with her dominant role in European affairs, an increased feeling in the national sense of power appeared. Thirdly and lastly, it gave the possibility to distract from internal political divisions, such as the opposition from the Social Democrats.Especially three leagues in Germany showed the contribution of nationalism to German foreign policy. The "German Colonial League" encouraged the acquisition of colonies; the "Pan German League" furthered an increase in arms and the promotion of German strength within and outside of Europe; the "German Navy League" called for a larger navy.The leagues reflected very much national feelings that Germany was to have a more dominant role in world affairs. This was essentially "Weltpolitik": Wilhelm II desired to make Germany a dominant world power, i.e. to have a say in world affairs and in his own words summarised Weltpolitik, stating, "nothing must henceforth be settled in the world without the intervention of Germany and the German Emperor.""Weltpolitik" was, in a sense, an attempt to solve and distract from domestic problems by uniting the country behind the Kaiser. In any case, "Weltpolitik" became a dominating factor in German foreign policy.In order for "Weltpolitik" to be achieved, military, economic and political expansion was required, as requested by the leagues. Political and economic expansion required the acquisition of colonies, which in turn implied that an increase in arms, especially the navy, was essential to secure these colonies. In addition, the military power could, if not to be used, at least exist as a threat to put more weight on Germany's role in international affairs.h4. Manifestations of "Weltpolitik""Weltpolitik" manifested itself wherever areas where open to European penetration. In Africa, protectorates had been declared over East Africa, South West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland. These were, though, minimal compared to British and French acquisitions.German relations with the Ottoman Empire were more prosperous. Plans to build a Berlin-Baghdad railway were potentially profitable yet were equally more likely to precipitate international disputes. Although the Turkish government had agreed with the "Deutsche Bank" to finance the project linking Baghdad with the Persian Gulf, it was a region of vital interest to both Russia and Britain.h4. ConsequencesAs a whole, the physical gains of colonial expansion were rather poor as a) the colonial empire amounted only to some one million square miles, b) merely some 505 million marks were invested in total and c) the colonies were dispersed around the globe and thus indefensible and vulnerable to attack (as shown by the war).It did, though, contribute to international tensions and paved the way for Germany's path to political isolation and encirclement.

The Road to World War I

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-18T22:19:00+01:00

In the summer of 1914 a series of events unfolded that would drag the nations of the world into a long and bloody conflict.But what caused this war? Where and when lie its origins? How could almost the entire world be dragged into this conflict that erupted over a small country in South-Eastern Europe?Over the next few weeks I would like to share with you my views on the causes of World War I:* "German Foreign Policy":/articles/2006/12/07/the-road-to-world-war-i-german-foreign-policy* "French Foreign Policy":/articles/2006/12/14/the-road-to-world-war-i-french-foreign-policy* "The Balkan Wars":/articles/2006/12/21/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-balkan-wars* "The Anglo-German Naval Race":/articles/2006/12/28/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-anglo-german-naval-race* "The First Moroccan Crisis":/articles/2007/01/04/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-first-moroccan-crisis* "The Bosnian Crisis":/articles/2007/01/11/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-bosnian-crisis* "The Second Moroccan Crisis":/articles/2007/01/18/the-road-to-world-war-i-the-second-moroccan-crisisSee also:* "The Road to World War II":/articles/2007/01/23/the-road-to-world-war-ii

Fidel Castro: History will absolve me

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-16T23:51:00+01:00

_In 1953 Fidel Castro launched an ill-fated attack on a military base in an attempt to spark a nation-wide revolution. Most of his men were killed and he was captured fleeing into the mountains.__During his trial Fidel Castro made one his most famous speeches, whose most known and cited passage is this:_"I warn you, I am just beginning! If there is in your hearts a vestige of love for your country, love for humanity, love for justice, listen carefully... I know that the regime will try to suppress the truth by all possible means; I know that there will be a conspiracy to bury me in oblivion. But my voice will not be stifled – it will rise from my breast even when I feel most alone, and my heart will give it all the fire that callous cowards deny it... Condemn me. It does not matter. History will absolve me."This speech is part of a series of famous speeches. Other speeches in this series:* "Winston Churchill: An iron curtain has descended across the Continent":/articles/2007/01/13/an-iron-curtain-has-descended-across-the-continentSee also:* "The rise and rule of Fidel Castro during the Cuban Revolution":/articles/2007/01/09/the-rise-and-rule-of-fidel-castro

Winston Churchill: An iron curtain has descended across the Continent

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-15T23:05:00+01:00

_The following is an excerpt from Winston Churchill's famous speech at Westminster College, Missouri, in which he coined the term "Iron Curtain".__This speech is yet another shining example of Winston Churchill's brilliant oratory skills and political clairvoyance._The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with this primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. As you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done, but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime.It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall rule and guide the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must, and I believe we shall, prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement.I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain - and I doubt not here also - toward the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships.It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung.Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to fight the wars. But now we all can find any nation, wherever it may dwell, between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with our Charter.In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected by the best judges to last for a further eighteen months from the end of the German war.I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable -- still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so.I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement.What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become.From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.Last time I saw it all coming and I cried aloud to my own fellow countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind.There never was a war in history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented, in my belief, without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous and honored today; but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool.We must not let it happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections.If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe, and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength, seeking no one's land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men, if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the high roads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time but for a century to come._This speech is part of a series of famous speeches. Other speeches in this series:_* "Fidel Castro: History will absolve me":/articles/2007/01/13/fidel-castro-history-will-absolve-meSee also* "The USSR and Eastern Europe: was Russia's control over Eastern Europe ever complete?":/2007/01/09/the-ussr-and-eastern-europe-was-russias-control-over-eastern-europe-ever-complete

Why and when did Germany lose the Second World War?

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-13T20:11:00+01:00

After the early stages of the year it seemed unlikely that anybody could stop the advance of the German Wehrmacht, guided by its modern, mechanised infantry and its superior _Blitzkrieg_[1] tactics. How then, did the sure seeming victory turn into the gradual defeat of Hitler's Third Reich?The epic _Battle of Britain_ was to be the first setback for Hitler. Although he never desired to attack Britain - after the fall of France he falsely believed she would negotiate for peace - _Operation Sea Lion_, the invasion of Britain was launched[2]. The Luftwaffe enjoyed numerical superiority over the RAF, and at first it seemed as though the bombing of shipping, coastal ports, airfields and factories would force Britain to her knees. Indeed, the Germans did not know just how close they were to victory. The situation changed when Allied planes bombed Berlin: Hitler had previously boasted about the invulnerability of the Reich capital and ordered vengeance. The Luftwaffe now switched its targets to London and provincial cities in the Southeast. This was decisive: the RAF had time to reorganise and shift its personnel and this, added to the superiority of their fighters and the effective usage of radar technology to spot German bombing raids, enabled Britain to stay in the war. The survival of Britain was significant for various reasons: for one, it meant a serious testing of the German army, secondly, it brought the USA, seeing more and more a threat in German expansion, closer to Britain and thirdly, it would provide a possible spring-board for future invasions. Morris comments on the Battle of Britain as a, "first checking of Germanys military triumphant progress", as well as an, "overstretching of her [Germanys] military resources that was to be her downfall[3]".It is difficult to determine to what extent the help from Britain's invisible ally, the USA, decided the Battle of Britain. As a matter of fact, the United States had followed a policy of isolation after the First World War and the intent to maintain neutral in the case of another war was clearly reflected in the Neutrality Acts[4]. Yet, Britain was reluctant on American trade and its credit. The initial _cash-and-carry_[5] system was short-lived as credits were soon used up. The pro-British policy, enhanced by the personal friendship between Churchill and Roosevelt, resulted first in the _Destroyer Deal_[6] and later in the _Lend-Lease_[7] arrangement. It is arguable whether or not the American aid decisively changed the Battle of Britain and hence the outcome of the war. Needless to say that the destroyers surely enabled a safer passage for the vital cargo supplied by the merchant ships[8], of which again the trade, as well as the war materials helped feed the population and strengthened the army.The more decisive change, however, arrived with the official entry of the USA into war. Following the surprise raid at Pearl Harbour[9] and the American declaration of war on Japan - an Axis Ally - Hitler, hoping Japan would attack Russia and thus relieve the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, declared war on the United States[10]. The power balance now clearly shifted to the allied side and, on the long run, with the two world's industrial powers and Britain, with all their resources and manpower on the opposing side, Germanys defeat was inevitable. Alan Bullock regarded Hitler's declaration of war against the USA as, "the greatest single mistake of the career".The first major defeat came during the North Africa Campaign. Rommel, commander of the German Africa Corps, became notorious for his strategic planning. With his forces he came right up to El Alamein[11], where he was, however, driven back after failing twice to break the British line of defence. Chased by the Eighth Army and finally encircled after the landing of Anglo-American troops in Morocco, the Corps surrendered[12]. The failing in North Africa meant the first real defeat for the Wehrmacht in the war and deprived Germany of valuable resources, such as oil. Furthermore, it now gave a springboard for an invasion of southern Europe.Although the invasion of Italy was attempted[13], German forces resisted a breakthrough further north. Political changes, the suspension of Mussolini that is, brought about the armistice with the Allies. This relieved them of all Italian forces, fighting on basically all Axis fronts, added to the fact that twenty-six German divisions were captured. The contribution of this remains disputed. Although the additional troops would have helped to hold the advancing Red Army, the eventual outcome was hardly affected. Summarising, the Battle of El Alamein and consequently the invasion of Italy were helpful, but by no means decisive.Already at the dawn of his political career, Hitler clarified his intention to create _Lebensraum_[14] in the East. This ideology and his hatred against communism made it obvious that some day he would attack Russia. When, however, Mussolini was coming close to a humiliating defeat in Greece, Hitler saw himself forced to help out. The commitment of twenty-eight divisions proved a costly side-show. Even more, _Operation Barbarossa_, the invasion of Russia, was postponed by six weeks. Six weeks more time before winter would break out; six less weeks for Stalin to prepare for what was inevitable. It is arguable to what extent this handicap influenced the outcome of the war, but for sure, with more time and troops available, war efforts would have gone far more efficient on the Eastern Front.Nevertheless, the invasion of Russia was launched[15]. Initial successes seemed to justify the optimistic views that the campaign would be over within eight weeks. It might appear simplistic to say that any two (or more) front war can, in the long term, only lead to defeat, or that any invasion of Russia is doomed to failure. Yet, the Great War had already shown the enormous strains of a two-front war. And considering that Russia is such a large, vast country, and with the support of the winter, which had already helped to defeat Napoleons army, the operation seemed a suicide mission.Although the Germans were still advancing, it seemed as though the tide was gradually turning on the Eastern Front. Leningrad, defended by soldiers and civilians, did not fall, the infamous winter - in which the warm-equipped Wehrmacht now faced a second fierce enemy - arrived sooner than expected and, even more, the civilians were ordered to _scorch the earth_[16] as the Germans penetrated deeper into the heart of Russia. And yet, the real setback came at the Battle of Stalingrad[17]. The Red Army encircled the entire German Sixth Army[18] while it was attacking the city, and despite orders from Hitler not to retreat or surrender, the commander of the army, von Paulus, and the remaining eighty thousand men eventually capitulated. Nathaniel Harris writes, "If there was such a thing as a turning point in the course of the Second World War, it was Stalingrad. The USSR would survive, and in time the Allies would win[19]". The Wehrmacht and with it its invincible reputation, had suffered a humiliating and costly (in terms of material and manpower) defeat. Added to that, the forces further south were forced to retreat in fear of being encircled. From then on, the German Army pursued a constant retreat.Although the United States had already entered the war in 1941, it was not until 1944, until their real effectiveness came into action in Europe. On D-Day[20], an invasion force of Allied troops landed on the Normandy beachhead, an area where the Germans had little expected an attack. With the help of Mulberry Harbours[21] and amphibious tanks, the Allies managed to establish a foothold in _Fortress Europe_. Now, there was a true two-front war, and the defeat of Germany was only a question of time.There remains no doubt that Hitler's decisions contributed largely to the eventual defeat of Germany. His orders to switch the main targets from airfields and factories to cities definitely gave Britain the necessary air to breathe and to survive during the Battle of Britain. Similarly, the invasion of Russia marked the gradual defeat. Although the Wehrmacht advanced, the invasion of Russia would ultimately change the outcome of the war. His rapid success had made him incautious and arrogant: he under-estimated both the British and Russian resistance. Simpler than that, one could discuss that the inability to invade Britain, or at least eliminating her before risking and invasion of Russia, was the eventual deciding factor. In the hypothetical situation of Britain having been invaded, it is highly unlikely that the USA could have contributed so significantly to the outcome of the war, in the sense of sending supplies, providing war materials and later help launch D-Day from the southern British coast. On the other hand again, one could argue that the Red Army could have won the war by itself, that is, without D-Day. The industrial plants of the Soviet Union were cleverly shifted to the untouched East and as the war proceeded, the output of war materials and men would sooner or later simply sweep over the Wehrmacht. This would, once again, pinpoint Hitler's decision to invade Russia as primarily fatal. This prediction, however, would have been worthless with the fall of Stalingrad and Leningrad (consequently meaning the probable surrender of the Soviet Union), clearly showing the importance of both these battles to the outcome of the war. Yet, the Allied landings did relieve the Eastern Front, where two-thirds of the Wehrmacht had been fighting. Attacking Russia was, in hindsight, one of the decisive mistakes Hitler made. Not eliminating Britain before was the other.Bibliography:* Years of Change - European History 1890-1945, by Robert Wolfson* European History 1848-1945, by TA Morris* Spotlight on the Second World War, by Nathaniel HarrisFootnotes:1 Air raids followed by ground attacks through infantry and fast tanks2 July 19403 European History 1848-1945, by T A Morris4 1935, 1936, 19375 instant pay6 The Americans gave 50 destroyers in exchange for the use of British Naval Bases in the Pacific7 American loans regardless of credits - this was, in fact, later on also extended also to Russia8 the Germans were sinking merchant ships with their wolf packs of U-boats9 December 7, 194110 December 11, 194111 70 miles to the west of Alexandria, Egypt12 May 194313 July 10, 194314 living space15 June 22, 1941; altogether 3,500,000 soldiers were used16 Basically to render all resources unusable - the Wehrmacht had to be supplied over longer and more difficult routes17 November 1942-February 194318 initially 300,00019 Spotlight on the Second World War, by Nathaniel Harris20 June 6, 194421 mobile docks

The USSR and Eastern Europe: was Russia's control over Eastern Europe ever complete?

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-12T06:19:00+01:00

What evidence is there to support the view that "Russia's control over Europe east of the 'iron curtain' was never complete"?Was Russia's control over Europe east of the Iron Curtain ever complete?Already during Stalin's days, one country that was included as being east of the Iron Curtain in Churchill's famous speech[1], had resisted Soviet domination. Unlike the other Eastern European countries, Tito and his partisans had freed Yugoslavia from Nazi occupation (during World War Two) without much help from the Red Army. Tito's enraged Stalin when he unilaterally dispatched troops to Albania to protect the country from a Greek civil war, and when he pursued a federation with Bulgaria, again without Soviet consultation. The split between Tito and Stalin demonstrated that an Eastern Europe country could openly resist Soviet rule. Yugoslavia's subsequent expulsion from the Cominform[2] was intended by Stalin to isolate her and force Tito to resign. However, Tito's popularity with his people was anchored too deeply and Yugoslavia appealed successfully to the West for help. Yugoslava had successfully resisted Soviet domination.East Germany was the first country to come out in open protest after Stalin's death. In East Berlin, 100,000 workers set out to demonstrate for better wages[3]. Although the riots were dispersed by Russian tanks, they nevertheless proved that, with Stalin gone, a country was prepared to openly protest to Soviet rule.To secure her control over Eastern Europe, solving economic problems (that is, rebuilding after the war) and binding these countries to the Soviet communist society would be of vital importance. The economic question became urgent when the "Marshall Plan"[4] was issued by the United States, offering financial aid to European countries. The Soviet Union rejected what it called "dollar imperialism" and banned Eastern European states from receiving Marshall aid. Instead, the Soviet Union formed the Comecon[5], intended to counter the "Marshall Plan" and to secure Russian domination over Eastern Europe. Similarly by intent was the "Warsaw Pact", created 1955, binding the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union militarily. It should be noted that this was the response to the German entry into NATO[6]. The Comecon and the Warsaw Pact highlighted Soviet attempts to secure and control Eastern Europe by economic and military means. Also, it showed that the USSR knew that a healthy economy was vital to maintain control over Europe east of the Iron Curtain. It would be economic discontent that sparked the uprising in Eastern Europe and lead to the downfall of the Soviet Union.The rise of Krushchev as the Soviet leader meant a further turning point for Russian relations with her eastern satellites. With his policy of _De-stalinisation_ - manifested in his "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU[7] - and, more significantly, his easing of tensions with Tito's Yugoslavia (illustrated by two visits during 1955-1956), proved to be an "invitation" to the satellite states. The message they perceived was that the Soviet Union had accepted Yugoslavia's claims to develop her own type of communism. If it applied to Yugoslavia, why should it not apply to them too? The results were independence movements, in particular in Poland and Hungary, throughout the year of 1956. In Poland, riots broke out at Poznan[8]. The motives were, though, initially not political. The weakening of the economic situation had provoked the workers to protest against the declining living standards and to demonstrate against wage restriction and high taxes. It was, more significantly, the long tradition of anti-Russian hostility that turned this uprising into a massive anti-government and essentially anti-Russian demonstration. Though Soviet tanks crushed the rebellion, Krushchev agreed that Gomulka, a popular leader who had been imprisoned under Stalin for "Titoism", should be allowed to reassume office as First Secretary of the party. Furthermore, Krushchev permitted Polish communism to develop in its own way, provided Poland would remain loyal to the "Warsaw Pact". It was, above all, Polish guarantees to remain loyal to the "Warsaw Pact" that hindered further Soviet involvement in Poland (up until the 1980s). Hungary, similarly, saw her chances for revision and, perhaps, more independence from Soviet influence after Krushchev's "Secret Speech". It should be noted, though, that the Soviet Union, treated Hungary, unlike Poland, as a defeated power (as she had been a satellite ally of Nazi Germany) and thus demanded large reparations sums. Rakosi, a hard-line Stalinist, had ruled Hungary as First Secretary of the Communist Party under Stalin's days. His rule was very repressive: the AVO[9] ruthlessly oppressed political opponents and the remaining stationed Russian troops served as a reminder of Soviet domination. Imre Nagy, who, like Gomulka, had been rejected under Stalin, replaced Rakosi as result of "de-stalinisation". Nagy issued some moderate reforms, such as allowing some peasants to leave the collective farms, turning the economy away from heavy industry and more to services, the press was allowed more freedom and some political prisoners were released. However, Rakosi was able to overthrow Nagy and again became Prime Minister[10]. Hatred against the repressive regime grew, living standards declined, anti-Russian feeling increased and Krushchev's speech stimulated desire for more independence - these factors contributed decisively to the uprising in October 1956. Soviet reactions were to put pressure on Rakosi, who, on the pretext of "illhealth", resigned in October 1956 and ceded his office once more to Nagy. This did not, however, decrease the rioting. On the contrary, Nagy furthered the situation by ending the one-party system and declaring Hungary's withdrawal from the "Warsaw Pact". To Krushchev, the latter was the deciding factor to take action. China, who saw the Hungarian revolt as a threat to the communist system and believed Hungary would serve as the falling domino, had put Krushchev under pressure to act. Even more, Krushchev's position was insecure and the presidential elections in the USA as well as the "Suez Crisis" distracted world attention. Thus, with Soviet military security at stake, Russian troops invaded Hungary[11]. In two weeks of bitter fighting, the Russians crushed the revolt with a death toll of 50,000 Hungarians and 7,000 Russians and further 180,000 Hungarian refugees fled to Austria. Kadar was appointed by the Soviets as the new premier and Nagy, falsely guaranteed safe conduct, was arrested and executed. In Czechoslovakia, there was considerable opposition to Soviet rule and the old-Stalinist Novotny, President and First Secretary of the communist party. The reasons were several: the Czechs were industrially and culturally the most developed of the Eastern bloc, thus objected to the over-centralised Russian control of their economy and rejected the censorship in the press and freedom of speech. Consequently, Novotny was voted out of office and Dubczek seized the office of Premier[12]. He introduced a number of reforms and initiated what became known as the "Prague Spring". Freedom of speech and press was allowed, the right to travel abroad was granted, judicial reforms were carried out and it was permitted to "question" the communist party - this "Action Programme" was what Dubczek called, "socialism with a human face". Meanwhile, the USSR was becoming worried that the reforms might threaten communist rule in Czechoslovakia, hence possible other Eastern European countries - thus being a threat to her own security. Dubczek, knowing of the Hungarian mistakes, repeatedly assured the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia would remain loyal to the communist society and the "Warsaw Pact". Soviet worries were reflected in the "Warsaw Letter"[13], signed by all the "Warsaw Pact" members except Czechoslovakia, in which these countries expressed their concerns over recent reforms in Czechoslovakia. Isolated from the socialist bloc, Dubczek again assured loyalty to the communist society. Nevertheless, Soviet fears that this newly won freedom might spread onto other Eastern European countries provoked intervention, and "Warsaw Pact" troops (Russian, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian that is) invaded Czechoslovakia. This unexpected act was condemned as hostile and deemed unnecessary by both non-communists and communists in Czechoslovakia. Dubczek was forced to restore censorship. The initial passive resistance turned into active protest when in January 1969 Jan Palach burned himself in protest to Soviet intervention. The victory of Czechoslovakia against Russia in the finals at the ice hockey world championships the same year was seen as symbolic and riots broke out in Prague. Consequently, the revolt was crushed and Dubczek, along with his reforms, was removed. Husak, a pro-Moscow communist, was appointed as the new leader. In 1970 the attention turned once more to Poland. Economic discontent initiated strikes and riots, and forced Gomulka, who had lost his popularity, to resign and Gierek was appointed as the new leader. In 1976, these demonstrations were lit up again as heavy debts with the Western world had lead to food shortages. As the situation did not improve, Gierek was forced to resign. Faced with the same problems as in 1976, that is, the poor economic conditions combined with the large debts and the food shortages, the strikes were furthered. At the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk workers formed "Solidarity"[14], initially a trade union that eventually turned into a nation-wide political movement, demanding freedom of speech and assembly, as well as the right to strike. The election of a Polish pope, John Paul II, in 1978 played its part in raising the strong catholic element in "Solidarity" and provided opposition to the communists. In December 1981, after the opposition had grown considerably, Martial Law was declared by General Jaruzelski, the newly appointed leader, which suspended civil rights and introduced a curfew. The army took command and telephone lines were cut to block communication between "Solidarity". In 1982, "Solidarity" was banned and suppressed, which was a fairly difficult task, considering that the membership had mounted to some 10 million, and its leader, Lech Walesa, was put under arrest. The murder of Father Popieluszko in 1984 by the Z.O.M.O.[15] caused a public and international outcry. Clearly, "Solidarity" was as much an oppositional group to the government as it was to the Soviet, communist domination. That its membership consisted of a large proportion of the population is self-explanatory and undermines the claim that Soviet domination of Europe east of the "iron curtain" was never fully complete.In fact, the crises situation in Eastern Europe all demonstrate that there was opposition to Soviet rule and that the domination she had seeked to secure by the "Comecon" and the "Warsaw Pact" which were essentially the causes for these uprisings, had failed. Up until the appointment of Gorbachev as Communist Party Secretary in the USSR (1985) and his policy of "Glasnost and Perestroika"[16] did the move towards democracy in Eastern Europe begin and the Soviet "grip" over these countries to fade. The control was finally abandoned with the dissolution of the "Warsaw Pact" in 1991. fn1. In his famous "Iron Curtain speech":/articles/2007/01/13/an-iron-curtain-has-descended-across-the-continent at Fulton, Missouri, USA, 1946fn2. 1948fn3. 1953fn4. 1948fn5. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, formed in 1949fn6. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, defensive alliance aimed at the USSRfn7. February 1956fn8. June 1956fn9. State Protection Group - secret policefn10. 1955fn11. November 3, 1956fn12. January 1968fn13. July 1968fn14. 1980fn15. secret policefn16. "openness" and "economic and social reform

To what extent was Nazi Germany a totalitarian state?

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-11T04:45:00+01:00

The question initially demands a definition of a "totalitarian" state. A nowadays generally accepted definition is described by George Orwell in his futuristic novel "Nineteen Eighty-Four". It suggests a political system and society where there the individual basically does not exist; a single party controls every aspect of "life". Every move, every step is watched with care; every opposition, possible resistance or incompatibility with the ideology of the party is tracked down by the police. Such fictional and absurd description sort of brought it to the point.Orwell wrote this in the late 1940's. Ten years later, historians in general saw the Nazi Regime as totalitarian. Nowadays this is not as widely accepted. The following paragraphs will show what relates to the Third Reich as totalitarian and what not.Nazism emerged out of the post-World-War-One Weimar Republic. The NSDAP was initially a small party, largely located in the south of Germany. Yet within a few years time the party managed to establish itself and when Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, Germany was in fact a one-party state; which, in effect, controlled every aspect in the life of the Aryan. However was there really one party, or was it the role of Hitler himself that enabled such totalitarian conditions? Hitler announced himself "Führer" by combining the functions of chancellor and president after the death of Hindenburg in August 1934 combined the functions of Chancellor and President[1]. Even more, he was also Commander-in-chief of all armed services. It is disputable if there was a one-party-state or more a sovereign one-man leadership. Nevertheless, all possibilities for liberal thinking vanished with the introduction of one government.The Third Reich was most definitely a one-way government, yet how was it structured? How was it able to influence every aspect in the life of the German? From a superficial point of view, the Nazi Regime appeared well organised and structured. However, Hitler himself rejected any document work and governmental issues. He was supposed to have believed that problems would be solved if no one interfered. This, for sure, could in effect not work out. In general, the Nazi Regime is now seen as confused. The question that naturally arises from this is how, then, was the Nazi Government able to stay in power? There are various reasons for this. For one, Hitler removed all internal (that is within the party) problems by deliberately encouraging interior competition. Secondly, opposition to the state was reduced by the mere fact that individual resistance groups were unable to unite against the common enemy (simply due to a lack of trust). Thirdly, and probably mainly, Hitler turned the Nazi Regime into a police state, often referred to as a "Terror State".The SS, short for "Schutz-Staffel", developed into the mainstay of Nazi Government. Initially thought to be the elite bodyguard for Hitler, it developed from a minor section within the SA an identity and structure of its own under the new leadership of Himmler. Although the SS was, in a way, a party of its own, it was still under the supreme control of Hitler, inevitably linking it to the state. Himmler created the SD, the "Sicherheitsdienst", as the Party's own internal police force. Under Himmler's control was also the "Gestapo"[2]. The Gestapo was feared for its brutality, clearly demonstrated in the "Night of the Long Knives"[3]. The SS-Police-SD controlled by Himmler and answerable only by Hitler, emerged a powerful force within Nazi-Germany. It preserved Nazi Politics by brutal and repressive policies of law enforcement. Furthermore, the influence of the police, especially that of the SS, would extend. The "Waffen-SS" became the elite military fighting unit, the "Death Hand Units" ran the concentration camps[4]; as Nazi control increased due to conquest in the war, the power of the SS enhanced in a way that it became responsible for the "New Order"[5]. So, the entire police system functioned not only as internal security, but also evolved influence in economic and military matters. Inevitably, it was the key group in the Third Reich.Naturally, a powerful police state will never be sufficient enough to guarantee nation-wide order. Before and after Hitler became Chancellor, the mighty propaganda machine played a vital role in the Nazi Party. Göbbels, Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, commented, "It is not enough for the people to be more or less reconciled to our regime, to be persuaded to adopt a neutral attitude towards us, rather we want to work on people until they have capitulated to us, until they grasp ideologically what is happening..." The two important forms of delivering the messages were the radio and the press. The radio was a fairly new invention and in 1932, less than a quarter of the German households owned a wireless. As a result, the government made provisions for the production of a cheap set, the "Volksempfänger"[6]. Seven years later, approximately three-quarters owned a radio, as well as every café, factory, offices and other public places had a loudspeaker installed. The press was more difficult to seize control of - after all, there existed 4,700 official newspapers in Germany. The Nazis publisher -- "Eher Verlag" -- bought many, the Propaganda Ministry held a daily press conference, and the "Editor's Law" finally made control over the press perfect. The propaganda areas extended onto film, music, literature and art. Most of these were used to portray the German culture, for example only German musicians were allowed to be played - music composed by Jews was forbidden. The Nazi Propaganda Machine was rendered perfect by social rituals. These included the "Heil Hitler" greeting, the Nazi salute, the "Horst Wessel"[7] song and the different kinds of uniforms all linked to the regime. This was even more exploited by the various ritual festivals. Estimating the impact of Nazi Propaganda on the population is virtually impossible. It would be unfair to misjudge the people at that time, which were indoctrinated by the constant repetition of Nazi ideology, from our liberal point of view. At that time, it was easier to believe what was presented rather than risk personal freedom, threatened constantly by the police.The role of the army in a political system is vital, since lack of support from the military would lead to domestic as well as foreign problems. Hitler, while combining the functions of the Chancellor and President, also declared himself Commander-in-Chief of all armed services. And as a matter of fact, the soldiers of the German army were obliged to swear an oath, not to the country, but to Hitler. Naturally, for the German soldier, bound to discipline and order by a long tradition, any future resistance would be considered as high treason. The army undoubtedly was a mainstay of the Nazi regime, in the false belief that it would maintain all the power it once possessed. Officers attempted to kill Hitler in 1944 when the war was going bad. The attempt failed. Even though it was a very brave act, the indecisive actions of that day reflected the confused state the army was in. Various social groups and organisations, logically all connected or linked with the Nazi state, influenced the aspect of every German, no matter what age or sex. All of these, cleverly thought to indoctrinate the people, spread Nazism and propaganda supporting Hitler or the Third Reich throughout Germany. Firstly, the workers. Hitler introduced a law that banned all labour unions or strikes of workers. Instead, a Nazi DAF[8] was set up, obviously controlled by Nazis. Wages, working hours, stable rents and recreational provisions were organised by the Nazi KDF[9]. Women were, from a feminine point of view, discriminated, to some extent similar like the 'inferior' races. The Nazis, on the other hand, claimed they would just treat them differently. The role of women in the Third Reich was simple and easy, in a chilling way named the "K, K, K", meaning "Kinder, Kirche, Küche"[10]. Basically, the Aryan female had to be fit and healthy, was to look good in a natural way, cook well and have as many children as possible. There was even a policy, allowing any women with a double-figured number of children to have tea with Hitler. Other than that, Hitler urged the importance on Germany's youth. Hitler expressed his views concerning this in 1933, "When an opponent declares, 'I will not come to your side', I calmly say, 'Your child belongs to us already ... In a short time they will know nothing else but this new community." There were various youth organisations, which had a total number of members between ten and eighteen years of age of nearly ten million people in 1938! Amongst those were the "Hitlerjugend"[11] or "Deutsches Jungvolk"[12]. Their main exercises consisted were of physical nature, to prepare them for war in every way and to indoctrinate them from an early stage onwards. Naturally, similar movements were made for girls. These were however brought up to be healthy and strong, in order to bear just as fit children. Education, in general, was one of the major targets of the Nazis. One of the distinct branches within the Nazi Party was the Nazi Teacher's League. The main subjects on education were physical education, history and biology. History was slightly altered to shine a good light on the 'superior' Aryan race and pushed strongly on the recent Nazi steps to power. Biology was more a less a 'racial science', it consisted mainly in describing distinguished features of 'inferior' races. Physical education, as already mentioned, was important to encourage competition, enforce discipline, and keep them healthy - in short, pre-war training. Special schools were provided for the (supposedly) most gifted and talented, these would be the future leaders of the Third Reich.Germany was (and is) a mainly Christian country. A Majority of people are either Protestants or Catholics. It is therefore not difficult to determine the influence the church could have on the people, in particular the possible opposition it could provide to the Nazis. Hitler knew that he could not afford to attack the church during his voting campaigns, and hence compromised on a "Concordat" with the church, granting religious freedom. Hitler's true feelings about the church were probably revealed during a private conversation in 1933: "One is either Christian or German. You can't be both." In reality, church officials who talked openly against Nazi politics were prosecuted, often sent to concentration camps, some of them even dying there. Even the religious schools were influenced. In effect, Hitler's book "Mein Kampf"[13] substituted the bible and the swastika replaced the cross.Reviewing the structure of the party and the impact on society, it would not be untrue to define Nazi Germany as "totalitarian". However, it can be criticised in two ways. First of all, although Germany was a one-party state, the Nazis did not have a unity or adequate organisation. Secondly, there was never a complete control over the economy, which would have been necessary to exercise full authority. Nevertheless, the Third Reich consisted of one party, maintained by a powerful police system and a public relation that controlled and influenced every aspect in the life of a German citizen.fn1. "Law concerning the Head of the State of the German Reich"fn2. Geheime Staatspolizei - Secret State Policefn3. Night in which Hitler ordered the assassination of many, as he thought, that opposed himfn4. Camps similar to prisons, not thought as extermination campsfn5. The elimination of 'inferior' races on occupied territoryfn6. People's Receiverfn7. Named after a petty criminal who was made a martyr after dying in street riotsfn8. "Deutsche Arbeiter Front" - German Labour Frontfn9. "Kraft durch Freude" - Strength through Joyfn10. children, church, kitchenfn11. Hitler Youthfn12. German Young Peoplefn13. My Struggle

Was the Cold War a result of Stalin adopting a policy contrary to the Yalta Agreement?

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-10T15:59:00+01:00

_The Cold War was the result of Stalin adopting a policy contrary to the Yalta Agreement._Certainly to many supporters of the Orthodox view, this statement will appear rather obvious. In their view, the origins of the Cold War, however, do not essentially lie in the aftermath of Yalta, but in the inevitable clash of capitalism and communism. That Stalin adopted what they consider a very aggressive policy was not so much the result of security, but the expansionist nature of Lenin-Marxism.Yet an analysis of a time of such incredible tension is not that simple. It could be argued that sooner or later the United States would inevitably clash with Soviet Russia due to ideological differences. The distrust between the two powers has its roots in the Russian Civil War[1], where the Western Allies of World War One[2] sent in supplies and men to help the anti-Bolshevik "Whites" defeat the Red Army. This was seen as an attempt to destroy communism in its early years and deeply resented by the Bolsheviks.The Second World War changed the situation. When Hitler launched "Operation Barbarossa"[3], it was estimated that Russia would be defeated within weeks, months at latest. Churchill, fearing the loss of not an ally but also a second front diverting German troops from his own front, immediately provided help to Stalin. The United States joined the Allies and the impossible had become reality: capitalism and communism were working hand in hand. Cooperation continued as the "Lend Lease"[4] arrangement was extended to Russia and ten million tons of war materials were sent by the US to Russia[5].It seems rather far-reaching to propose that circumstances were all that well until Yalta, and that the agreements reached there actually led to the Cold War. Despite the cooperation to defeat the common German enemy, already during the Second World War a gulf of distrust opened between the USSR and the two western powers, Britain and the USA. Since late 1941 Stalin urged Churchill to "open" a second front and thus relieve the Red Army. To the Soviets the denial of a second front meant that the USA and Britain were deliberately aiming to weaken the Russians. Although Sicily was invaded[6], Italy eventually liberated[7] and D-Day launched[8], the Red Army was by that time already sweeping towards Germany, arousing Soviet suspicion that the Western Allies were merely trying to halt communist hegemony over Europe.Another factor that created friction was US capital and the "Lend-Lease" agreement. As compensation for delaying an opening of a second front, the Russians proposed a US loan of $1000 million at 1.25% interest rate over a period of twenty-five years. The US Congress rejected the proposal: for one, reserves were exhausted and post-war credits seemed to great a risk, and secondly, given the current inflation rates, the terms would equal more to a present. Although "Lend-Lease" was granted to Russia, bringing in arms, foods and raw materials, a requested loan of $6000 million could not be agreed on due to the conflicts with the interest rate. Before the war, the US government was inexperienced and rather perplexed on how to deal with Soviet Russia. The results were little to no relations between the two countries. World War Two merged the two countries into an uneasy co-operation. Whether these events caused friction or were simply the results of distrust remains disputed. Clearly, according to the Orthodox view, it was the Marxist-Leninist natural hostility towards capitalism that contributed to the rise in tension: unacceptable terms for loans were proposed, and after being rejected, resented. However, Soviet claims that the Allies deliberately held back a second front could equally be justified, or at least partially, when misunderstood. Nevertheless, although distrust had developed, destroying the common enemy, Nazi Germany, was an aim prior and above anything else.Yet as Yalta came, the situation had changed: the Wehrmacht was being pushed back on all fronts and Germany found herself on the verge of defeat. Time was ripe to discuss post-war plans. The common enemy had united them - could this status be prevailed during times of truce?The positions and policies were very much set before the meeting in the Crimea. An analysis of each of the approaches helps understand the difficulties the powers had in settling problems. Following the air raid against Pearl Harbour by the Japanese, Hitler promptly declared war against the United States. The United States, unlike Russia, was pushed into the struggle following an invasion. The USA desired to stabilise the power in Europe by safe-guarding an equilibrium against those who wished to destroy it. Besides that, Roosevelt and Churchill had signed the "Atlantic Charter"[9] in which the wilsonian principles of self-determination and free democratic elections within a liberal-capitalist economy should be imposed on to all countries liberated from Nazi rule. Western ally policy, therefore, would consist in restoring a power equilibrium in Europe and by structuring European countries, including the Eastern states, with democratic institutions based on the American one. The USSR, all ahead Stalin, held a completely different attitude towards future Europe. Russia had been invaded twice within the last thirty years and was bound to create a security network around it. This involved the installation of friendly, pro-Soviet, in other words (at least partial) communist, governments.The future of Poland and Germany caused the two most serious disagreements between the USSR and the Western Allies. As already stated, Germany had invaded Russia twice since the turn of the century and Stalin sought to never let that happen again. His aim was to cripple Germany with heavy reparation payments and by draining its natural resources. This was contrary to Anglo-American policy which targeted to restore status quo in Europe by helping Germany (and the rest of Europe) to recover economically.One of the major weakpoints of Yalta was that no specific agreements were reached concerning the two major problems. Germany[10], it was decided, should be divided into three zones - a British, an American and a Russian - whereby an additional French one would be cut out from the Anglo-American share. Similarly the capital, Berlin[11], would be parted into four sectors. Stalin furthermore urged for the reparations payments to be fixed at $20,000 million which Churchill opposed to, feeling it would leave Russia too strong economically. Not very efficiently tackling the problem, the proposed figure was left as a basis for future discussions. As a result Germany was effectively geographically divided and the different policies of East and West would be stamped onto either zone or sector. The British, Americans and French would join to rebuild Germany economically for a united, stable Europe, while the Russians would cripple their partition by exploiting the resources they believed adequate to the agreed reparations. Even more, if problems would arise, then Berlin would be the main area of confrontation: it was geographically located inside the Soviet zone, but was under rule of four different sectors. This is precisely what happened during the Berlin Blockade. In March 1946, General Clay, in charge of the US sectors, withheld reparations as the Soviet Union refused to send in food supplies (as agreed at the Potsdam Conference[12]). The forming of the Socialist Unity Party[13] caused fear of the spread of communism onto Germany, while on the other hand the election of Ernst Reuter[14] as Mayor by the whole of Berlin was not accepted by the Stalin due to his anti-Soviet remarks. The division between East and West centralised and reflected onto Germany. When the Americans and the British (and soon after the French too) integrated their zones economically[15], it was seen as a threat by the Soviets of an Anglo-American domination. After a secret meeting[16], where the Western Allies agreed on creating a unified West German state with a strong economy, they refused to report the outcome of the meeting to Marshal Sokolovsky[17], he walked out in protest during an Allied Control Council[18]. The Allies were well aware that their economic plans to rebuild Germany would ultimately clash with Stalin's idea of exploiting German resources. The Russians introduced the blockade after the Western Allies introduced the new Deutsch-Mark[19] as a currency in their sectors. Sokolovsky described it quite rightly as a," breach of the Potsdam agreements," where it had been settled that Germany would be treated as a single economic unit. The result was a serious period of tension, with East and West on the brink of war, and it all derived from the inability to reach concise decisions at Yalta concerning the reparations sums.The other major area of importance was Poland. The "Atlantic Charter", as described already, was the policy of the Western Allies. Ensuring that the Provisional Government, which had lived in exile in London during the war, would return to Poland and that free, secret suffrage could be held were the principle aims for the Americans and the British. To Stalin, however, Poland was more of strategic importance. Poland had always been the "corridor" for invasions of Russia and it meant for Stalin that she should remain friendly and loyal to the Soviets. As the Red Army had partially occupied Poland, it had already set up a government, known as the "Lublin Government", which was basically a communist one. At Yalta, the difficult issue was settled by integrating both governments in a more democratic way; free elections would be held later. Soon after the agreements, however, the mixed government was overthrown and replaced by a completely communist one. The Polish example was not an exception: the entire Eastern European states that had been liberated by the Red Army (that excluded Yugoslavia) fell either by immediately creating a communist regime or by first creating a coalition government that was then overthrown by communists. While it could be argued that the communist parties in each country had acted on their own, the Red Army possessed enough power stop this process. The fact that this was not the case and that free elections were not held, all contrary to the Yalta agreements, can be blamed on Stalin. He was able to interrupt the processes yet did not. Although according to Stalin communism was the true form of democracy (it expressed the will of the people), the institutions and governments were in contrast to the "Atlantic Charter" as proposed at Yalta. This creation of the "Iron Curtain", i.e. a border separating East from West, was a major source of tension for the Cold War and it, no doubt, was the result of Stalin adopting a policy contrary to Yalta, even if it was in the name of Soviet security.It could, however, be argued that the events in Eastern Europe, i.e. the communist take-overs, where the result of Stalin adopting a counter-policy towards the "Truman Doctrine". The US policy as defined by president Truman was essentially formed by "Kennan's Long Telegram"[20] - stating that it was Soviet intention to undermine Western policies - and Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech"[21] - which requested armed forces for the United Nations, demanded a right for democracy in every country and warned of Soviet expansion. To Stalin Churchill's speech and hence the "Truman Doctrine", was a hostile attack on Russia, regarding it as, "a dangerous move, calculated to sow discord among the Allied states and to make co-operation difficult," and that Churchill had in effect, "taken the position of a war-monger."[22] This was basically the revisionist view on the origins of the Cold War: Russia was not to blame for her desire for security. After all, the United States was economically stronger and possessed the A-bomb. There was no initial intention to sovietise Eastern Europe, but the American capitalist expansion was feared as an attempt to dominate Europe and a direct threat to the USSR and had to be countered. This was especially true when Truman announced in his doctrine to give economic aid to any country threatened by "totalitarian" regimes, clearly meaning Russia.In a completely different area of the world there developed a new source of tension - this time actually the cause of Stalin adopting a policy according to the Yalta agreement. At Yalta, Stalin agreed that war would be declared on Japan three months after Germany's defeat. This was done and resulted in a Soviet occupation of the northern part of Korea. Like Germany, Korea was now a division between capitalism and communism - the Soviets installed a socialist government while the US placed a democratic system onto the southern part. Although the installation of a communist regime was once again a counter-action towards Yalta, Stalin did declare war on Japan. Despite the departure of both Soviet and US troops from the country in the summer of 1949, the two types of government were left behind. In June 1950, the North attacked the South and soon the Seoul, the capital was taken. US President Truman instantaneously ordered troops to Korea and proposed to the United Nations to do the same. Interestingly enough, the foundation of the United Nations was yet another agreement of Yalta. The organisation would, once the war was over, guarantee peace. The Allied powers, however, could use a "veto" to block any action taken by the United Nations. This meant that Stalin could have actually hindered the Korean War by use of the veto; yet, the Russian delegate was not present at the Security Council Meeting, in protest of the fact that the new "People's Republic of China" was not accepted as the official Chinese government.In summary the Yalta decisions were highly controversial. On one side they made no specific plans on the future of Germany and the reparations to be made by her. On the other, Stalin signed his agreement towards the principles of the "Atlantic Charter" only to misinterpret "democracy" and the pricinple of self-determination, and instead installed communist regimes in conquered countries. Furthermore, encouraging the USSR to join the war against Japan left its seeds in Korea creating a major area of tension during the Cold War. Nazi-Germany as a common enemy united the Allies but proved to be the only glue in a shaky alliance. When at Yalta the outcome of the war had basically been decided and important post-war decisions could be made, the true intentions of both sides revealed. The rivalry between the superpowers was born long before, but the decisions at Yalta eventually created two blocs, East and West - the main opponents during the Cold War. fn1. 1919-22fn2. Britain, USA and France; at first these troops were meant to restore the Tsarist regime and bring Russia back into the warfn3. the invasion of Soviet Russia, launched June 1, 1941fn4. war loansfn5. between the years 1941-1944fn6. 1943fn7. 1943fn8. June 6, 1944fn9. August 1941fn10. and Austriafn11. note aside that Vienna was treated alike to Berlinfn12. July 1945: by agreement, the Soviet Union was allowed reparations of 25% of the industrial equipment from the Western zones in exchange for 15% for coal and supplies from the Soviet zonefn13. 80% of its member came from the former German Socialist Party (SPD)fn14. June 1947fn15. January 1947; the zone created was named "Bi-zonia"fn16. held February 1948 in London; the USA, Britain and France took partfn17. the military governor of the Soviet zonefn18. March 1948fn19. June 23, 1948fn20. Kennan had been US ambassador to Russiafn21. held in Fulton, Missouri, USA in March 1946fn22. Interview with Stalin, published with a "Pravda" correspondent, March 14, 1946

The rise and rule of Fidel Castro during the Cuban Revolution

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-01-09T14:11:00+01:00

When Fidel Castro marched into Havana in January 1959, a two-year armed struggle had ended. Yet, for Castro and the Cuban people the strife for independence had begun long before.Whenever there is a revolution or a change in government, there has to be a basis for change -- conditions that provoke and facilitate an uprising. Conditions in Cuba were harsh, and the discontent would sow the seeds of the revolution.The power in Cuba was shared between two entities: The United States of America and Batista. The United States of America exercised great influence on Cuba's domestic affairs: ever since they had "liberated" the Caribbean island from Spanish colonial rule[1], they ensured their domination by the Platt Amendment -- which granted them military bases (notably Guantanamo Bay, which still exists today) and the right to intervene in Cuba's affairs. On top of that, US Companies controlled the key industries, including but not restricted to sugar and rum, owned half of the land, a majority of the railway and the complete electricity and telephone services. Although the Cubans had been freed from Spanish rule, they were now dominated by another foreign power. The spirit of independence was kept alive.The second power in Cuba was Batista, a military dictator, supported by the USA. In 1952, when it seemed as though Fidel Castro's party was going to win the elections, Batista seized control by a military coup. Immediately, he banned elections, removed freedom of speech and crushed political opposition. The repressive police force used methods of torture and imprisonment without trial to deal with opponents of the state. Cuba tumbled into an abyss of corruption, gambling, prostitution, poverty and unemployment. Batista had reignited the flames of revolution.But Castro could not deterred. After Batista had dissolved his party so close to victory, Castro decided that action had to be taken by force. In a plan doomed to failure he ordered an attack on the Moncada Barracks, a military base. The idea was to arm the rebels, encourage a national uprising and thus spark off a revolution. The odds were against him: with his fellow hundred rebels he stood no chance against the thousand soldiers that were stationed at the base. Nevertheless he believed that, with the element of surprise on his side, they might achieve victory. The coup was launched on July 26, but failed after a patrol struck alarm. Most of the rebels were arrested or, like Castro, caught on flight. Many were tortured and executed. Castro's trial was held in secrecy, where he held one of his most famous speeches, finishing off with, "history will absolve me, …" Before, however, he would be absolved in to history, he was sentenced to fifteen years of prison. Although the entire plan had failed, it made people aware of the resistance to Batista. On top of that he used, similar to Hitler, the trial to his advantage and gained popular support throughout Cuba. This marked the true birth of the Cuban Revolution.Castro spent his time in prison reading books (such as Marx) and educating his fellow rebels. The situation in Cuba changed to his advantage: anti-government activities decreased, the sugar industry was booming, foreign relations with the USA were good and Batista was re-elected. This comforted Batista, and he felt safe enough to declare a political amnesty[2], resulting in Castro's release from prison[3]. Forced into exile, however, he travelled through the United States for seven weeks to collect money to finance his revolutionary plan. Weapons were bought and guerrilla warfare was drilled in Mexico, where Ché Guevara and Camillo Cienfuegos joined the rebels. A donation of forty thousand dollars by the Cuban opposition leader enabled them to buy the notorious yacht "Granma", which would be used to transport the rebels to the Cuban shore. Meanwhile in Cuba support for Castro grew. His legendary journey with the "Granma" began November 25, 1956 - and legend has it that she withstood heavy storms while carrying eighty-two armed rebels although constructed to hold only a fraction of that weight. The landing was ill-fated: after a government plane had spotted them, they were forced to abandon their supplies and to move inland, where a local farmer betrayed them. The resulting ambush of government troops killed most of the rebels -- only seventeen survived, among them Castro, Guevara and Cienfuegos. They fled into hiding in the Sierra Maestras. Their survival meant a new, even if little, hope for victory. To show he was alive and well, Castro invited an American journalist[4] to interview him. With the rebel victory at the outpost of El Uvero[5] Batista's forces gave up the mountain region of Oriente province.Throughout the next two years, the rebels established their headquarters in the Sierra Maestras from which they launched their assaults, usually in the cover of the night, on government troops. A number of factors where crucial for rebel survival in the mountains. Above all, it was due to the support of the peasants. By educating the peasants, providing them with free health care and by increasing their wages through pressurising the sugar plantation owners the rebels were guaranteed hideouts, food and clothing from the local population. Yet supplies alone were not enough to seize a whole island, and so the rebels built an armoury to repair and build weapons, laid telephone lines to connect fifty-five outposts and broadcasted a rebel radio to the Cuban people. Without doubt the peasants where the decisive factor that contributed to rebel survival in the mountains and the establishing of a communications network provided the basis for assaults.Victory followed victory and soon the rebels controlled basically the entire eastern part of Cuba. Batista, who still had US support despite the suspension of arms shipments[6], launched an attack on the rebels[7]. Although the government army was superior in numbers and armaments[8], the rebels achieved victory. This was largely due to the poorly trained government armies, who, unlike the guerrilla rebels, could not make use of the (mountain) landscape. Using constant harassing and ambushing, combined with the excellent intelligence network and the moral advantage of fighting for a cause, the rebels gradually forced Batista's army to its knees[9]. Besides that, Castro guaranteed good treatment to the prisoners so government soldiers would be more likely to surrender to the rebels. Rebel victory was a mere question of time, and two days after Ché Guevara liberated Santa Clara[10] Batista left the country.Initially Castro had no intention of becoming head of state. Urrutia, an anti-Batista conservative, was appointed new President. Castro remained "commandente-en-jefe"[11]. The new government issued moderate reforms, such as lowering the rents, improving the wages and attacking gambling and prostitution. However, the "real" power remained in Castro's hands - ha had gained a lot of popularity and influence through the revolution and kept up contact with the people (via television speeches or simply talking). Castro became Prime Minister in February after the former resigned[12].The rebels had spent two years in peasant shelter and knew well of the their needs - improving their conditions would be a primary target for reform. The first step was by restricting the maximum farm size to a thousand acres; anything above was expropriated, converted into co-operative farms or redistributed among the peasants. In June the same year, a large number of cattle farms[13] were seized by the government. Besides managing the co-operative farms, the newly founded INRA[14] was also in charge of the construction of roads, hospital, schools and housing. Yet, protests started out in the country: the conservative press attacked Castro of being a communist and President Urrutia publicly attacked the Cuban Communist Party. Following this, Castro resigned and denounced the president in a television speech. As a result, Urrutia was forced to resign and the public demanded Castro to resume duties[15]. This had two decisive effects: for one, it showed that the public stood behind Castro and his politics, and, from then on, Castro would continually place more and more communists in the cabinet, replacing liberals and other possible opponents.After Batista left and the rebel army took over the military bases and prisons, the true crimes of the former regime became evident: torture chambers, dead bodies and unnamed graves were found. The cry for justice was heard throughout the country. Castro answered by starting what Ché Guevara euphemistically called "revolutionary justice". Batista's henchmen, accused of having tortured and killed prisoners and political opponents where put on "show trials"[16] - the improper judiciary procedures where heavily condemned by the USA - and in nearly all cases found guilty and executed[17]. Three months later, forty-four Batista air force pilots were tried but found innocent on deliberately bombing civilians. However, Castro forced a retrial after which the pilots were found guilty and sentenced to prison. "Revolutionary justice," Castro argued, "is based not upon legal precepts, but on moral conviction." Effectively "revolutionary justice" had replaced law and order in Cuba, and Castro showed his true despotic colours.August 1959 was a decisive stage in the Cuban revolution. While many of who opposed Castro fled to Florida, a few staid behind to lead a "counter revolution". Eliminating this opposition would be crucial for the survival of the revolution. Unlike their predecessors, the counter-revolutionaries did not enjoy peasant support and gradually succumbed into exile or were captured. Defeating opposition showed that the people stood behind Castro. Even with the counter-revolutionaries removed, opposition still had to be taken care of. "Committees for the Defence of the Revolution" were set up for vigilance, to keep regime critics in check and to "defend the revolution". Although Castro has been accused of making use of purges in his judiciary system, one could still expect a fair trial when not convicted of political opposition.Education was another challenge the government faced. Castro stressed the importance of education in the "First Manifesto" issued during the rebel days in the Sierra Mountains. "An intensive campaign against illiteracy, and civic education emphasising the duties and rights of each citizen to his society and country," was to be the mission of his provisional government. Castro turned his words to actions when he came to power: primary education was made compulsory and the illiteracy problem was tackled and solved in the "Year of Education". Throughout the year of 1961, "Brigadistas" - young literacy workers - taught reading and writing even in the most remote areas of Cuba. By the end of the year Castro declared that illiteracy had been wiped out. The reform of education was one of the greatest achievements of Castro's government, but it also had a political side to it. For Castro it was clear, "The countries that are the most exploited economically and the most oppressed politically are the countries that have the most illiterates."[18] Evidently, for Castro the struggle for education was an extension of the struggle for independence.Castro liked to quote José Marti, "without economic independence, there can be no political independence." Both Marti and Castro targeted this statement at the United States, which owned a lot of the industry in Cuba. Apart from that, Cuba was economically backward. The plan was to get rid of the dependence of sugar and to build new factories instead. This ended in a disaster: Cuba was without raw materials to supply the industry and did not posses the necessary technology to support such a rapid advance. Ché Guevara explained the failures, "Our first error was the way we carried out diversification […] The entire economic history of Cuba had shown that no other agricultural activity would give such returns as those yielded by the cultivation of sugar cane […] The second mistake was that of dispersing our resources over a great number of agricultural products [this] produced a great weakness in the [organisation of] agriculture."[19] Quite rightly to him the failure resulted from the shifting of the industry away from sugar, depriving the economy of its main source of income. As a consequence, the government from then on relied on the sugar harvest and issued "The Battle for the Ten Million Tons"[20]. It aimed to produce ten million tons of sugar by the end of 1970. Posters throughout the entire country encouraged Cubans to contribute in any way they could, soldiers and volunteers were moved to the fields to cut the canes - it seemed as though the people were willing to help their country. However, due to machinery breakdowns, problems with transportation, low cane yields and bad weather the far-reaching goal was not achieved. The battle was a setback for the government, the society and the revolution - they had expected much, worked hard and still not achieved their goal.Despite economic changes, Cuba was also bound to great social changes. Free health care and medical treatment were now available to any Cuban citizen. As a result, hygiene and sanitation greatly improved, infant mortality drastically decreased and the life expectancy was raised. The availability of medicine was greatly due to the Soviet Union, which shipped in the necessary equipment from her eastern satellite states. Improving the health was a great achievement of the revolution and a common trademark for socialist states. However, also the role of the church was changed through the revolution. Religion was banned from schools, the number of priests was reduced and churches could not be in new settlements. This meant a great change to the Cuban society, which, as a former Spanish colony, had been very much indoctrinated to the Christian belief.Cuba is nowadays seen as one of the last communist states. When Castro came to power he had no intentions of creating a communist society. When he issued the land reforms he was unjustly stamped a communist - redistributing the land is not a communist trademark. He desired a socialist state where everybody enjoyed work, free education and free health care. He wanted to free Cuba to political independence by creating an independent economy. This resulted in a clash with the United States and hence a trade embargo and Cuba ran into the Soviet Union on which it was now economically dependent. Although there were great setbacks in the economic sector and a doubtful judiciary system (when dealing with political opponents) was set up, Castro could claim great successes in the areas of social welfare.fn1. 1898 during the Spanish-American Warfn2. November 1954fn3. May 1955fn4. _New York Times_, February 17, 1957fn5. May 28, 1957fn6. May 4, 1958 - Washington disapproved Batista using the arms for domestic affairsfn7. May 24, 1958fn8. 10,000 soldiers, Sherman tanks and armoured vehiclesfn9. army retreats from the Sierra Maestras August 7, 1958fn10. December 31, 1958fn11. commander-in-chief -- head of the rebel army; the title he still occupies nowadaysfn12. Cardonafn13. 133 to be precise, many of which were in American handsfn14. Institute of National Agrarian Reformfn15. July 1959fn16. January 1959fn17. it is estimated that overall 4000 people were sentenced to deathfn18. Fidel Castro, in a speech to voluntary Literacy Teacher, September 1961fn19. Ché Guevara, an article from "International Affairs", published in London, 1964fn20. announced by Castro in 1964 during his visit to the Soviet Union

The Art of Negotiation (or: how Dale Carnegie's advice can save you money)

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2006-10-26T12:25:00+02:00

Today I had an enlightening experience in the fine art of negotiating. I thought I'd share this experience here in the hope that you will benefit personally or help benefit your company by saving money when buying.I work for a telecom company and at this time of year there are a lot of conferences which always prove to be great opportunities to refresh existing contacts and meet new prospects for future business. As useful as these conferences may be, the tickets are by no means cheap and whenever I see the price I hear my CFO saying in his stern, authoritive voice "was this really necessary?" while he subtly waves the invoice in front of my face.Now for one particular conference coming up in Prague I saw the chance to save our company some money and avoid the inevitable confrontation with members of our finance department. It read: special discount for local companies. Great, I thought, we're not based in Prague but we have a subsidiary there so surely we qualify for the discount.You can imagine my fury when our application was returned with the note:"Thank you for your application. Regrettably we cannot qualify you as a local operator"Armed with my phone I embraced myself for a heated negotiation battle. I'll show them who's the local operator here!The sales person for the conference picked up the phone and in a friendly voice said: "Hello, this is Carl speaking. How can I help?"."Carl", I replied, "this is Philipp speaking. I am calling about my application for the conference in Prague. I must say I'm angry that you refused to grant us the local operator discount". What an entry, I thought, that'll put him off balance.He continued his friendly tone and countered, "Ah yes, I remember and please let me explain. You're company is not based in Prague and although you do business here we have decided that you are not a local operator."My inner temperature was rising; I was boiling inside. "What!? Surely we are a local operator, we don't just do business in Prague, we also have a subsidiary there, surely you would consider a Prague company regardless of who owns it a local company?" I was convinced I nailed him, indeed pierced him with my logic. There was no escape from this argument."I understand Philipp, but we have these kind of requests often, there is nothing I can do. My superior will tell you the same."I realized I was getting no where. Neither my aggressive behavior nor my attempt to reason with logic had won him over. In short, I had blundered.Then I had a moment of inspiration.I had been reading Dale Carnegie's masterpiece book "How to win friends and influence people" and an entire section was devoted to winning people over to your way of thinking. These we're the principles that suddenly came to light in my mind:* The best way to get to most out of an argument is to avoid it* Get the other person to say "yes" as often as possible* Talk in terms of the other person's interests* People love the sound of their own nameIn a split second I changed my tactic:"Carl", I started over, "am I correct in thinking that you want us to participate at this conference?""Yes, of course", he replied, somewhat astonished that I would ask a question with such an obvious answer."Carl, I understand that you are a sales person like myself, is this correct too?" I continued."Well, yes" he answered, with slight hesitation, probably wondering what I was up to."And if I am not mistaken you will receive a commission when you sell me the tickets?" I asked."Yes!" he exclaimed and even though I couldn't see his face his tone of voice suggested a newly injected enthusiasm.I know I had found the magic words that would win him over, the key to unlock the door to his goodwill. When I asked him to reconsider giving us the discount he promised to call me back within the hour after checking with his superior. When he called me back he said that it had been a hard fight but he would give me the full discount.So it is true after all: we as humans are governed by emotions and not by logic. Speaking in a friendly way, eliciting positive responses and talking in his interest won over the other person where aggression and reasoning failed miserably. The nice thing about this conversation was that we both profited -- he won his commission and I saved money -- and that, after all, is what business and dealing with people is all about.

The Rails Way: migrating from one-to-many to many-to-many

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2006-07-04T18:49:00+02:00

I must confess I was initially weary of migrations. But I tend to refactor mercilessy when I code and more often than not this refactoring involves changing the database.When I started coding "17books.com":http://17books.com I had only one copy of the database -- on my laptop. But the moment I uploaded a copy of the site (then still in development) for my colleagues to test I knew I was heading for trouble.After giving migrations a go I became a convert overnight.I thought I'd share the non-obvious migrations here in the hope that they will be useful to other merciless refactorers. I'll assume that you're familiar with the basics of migrations, in particular that you can generate migrations and can do basic operations such as adding tables and columns.Down to business. Say you're creating a movie database (taking on IMDB are we?) and for a start you would like to record films and their directors. Here's how you've defined your tables:

  create_table "directors", :force => true do |t|
    t.column "name", :string
  end

  create_table "films", :force => true do |t|
    t.column "name", :string
    t.column "director_id", :integer
  end

Eagerly you start adding your favourite directors:{background:#ddd}_|id|name |{background:#eee}| 1 | Steven Spielberg |{background:#eee}| 2 | George Lucas |And then their early films from the late 70s onwards:{background:#ddd}_|id |name |director_id |{background:#eee}| 1 | Jaws | 1 |{background:#eee}| 2 | Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope | 2 |But then you get to 1981 and want to add _Raiders of the Lost Ark_ ... and run into a problem. It turns out Steven Spielberg and George Lucas teamed up to direct this film together, but our @films@ table allows only one director per film!What we need to do is turn the one-to-many association between directors and films into a many-to-many association. In plain text, we need to allow more than one director per film.How can we do this with migrations without losing our data?First we need to create the table that will link films to directors:

  create_table "directors_films", :id => false do |t|
    t.column :film_id, :integer
    t.column :director_id, :integer
  end

Now comes the key part: we transfer the existing film directors to the newly created table:

  execute "INSERT INTO directors_films " +
     "SELECT id AS film_id, director_id AS director_id FROM films"

That's the hard part done with, now we can safely drop the redundant director foreign key from the films table:bc. remove_column :films, :director_idEyes closed, fingers crossed -- let's migrate:bc. $ rake migrateNo data should be lost, but let's check anyway. First the films table:{background:#ddd}_|id |name |{background:#eee}| 1 | Jaws |{background:#eee}| 2 | Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope |Looks good. The @director_id@ column is gone, as expected. How about the @directors_films@ table?{background:#ddd}_|film_id |director_id |{background:#eee}| 1 | 1 |{background:#eee}| 2 | 2 |Excellent! No data has been lost, migrations (and a bit of SQL) saved the day.For the sake of completeness let's add _Raiders of the Lost Ark_. I'm not keen on SQL so let's do this in Ruby:

  $ ruby script/console
  >> indy = Film.create("name" => "Raiders of the Lost Ark")
  >> steven = Director.find(1)
  >> george = Director.find(2)
  >> indy.directors << steven
  >> indy.directors << george
  >> indy.save

*Note:* the above assumes that you have defined the following associations in your models:

  class Director < ActiveRecord::Base
     has_and_belongs_to_many :films
  end

  class Film < ActiveRecord::Base
    has_and_belongs_to_many :directors
  end

I've tested the above in PostgreSQL, but it should work equally in MySQL. Let me know if you experience any problems.

Fixing the preverifier build error for Mpowerplayer on Mac OS X

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-03-31T21:05:00+02:00

If you're using the "Mpowerlayer SDK":http://mpowerplayer.com/products-sdk.php for your J2ME development on Mac OS X, and you get the following ant build error:

  $ ant
  Buildfile: build.xml
  
  compile:
  
  preverify:
       [exec] Error preverifying class java.lang.Class
       [exec]     VERIFIER ERROR java/lang/Class.newInstance0()Ljava/lang/Object;:
       [exec] Illegal type in constant pool
       [exec] Result: 1
  
  package:
  
  BUILD SUCCESSFUL
  Total time: 1 second

Then you can fix it by changing the following entry in your @build.xml@:bc. tobc. The error seems to lie in the Java 1.5+ classes that are included in the original @build.xml@. The fix points the build file to the Java 1.4.2 classes that are also conveniently installed by default on Mac OS X.

Ruby on Rails and Postgres: how to clear out sessions

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-05-06T20:45:00+02:00

If you're running Ruby on Rails with a PostgreSQL database then you can clear out old session data by executing this command from your application directory:

ruby script/runner -e production \
    "ActiveRecord::Base.connection.delete(\" \
     DELETE FROM sessions \
     WHERE updated_at < timestamp 'now' - interval '24 hours'\")"

This removes any sessions older than one day.You might want to run this on a regular basis, perhaps even automatically with a cron entry.This is the equivalent of the MySQL command described in the great book _Agile Web Development With Rails_ (2nd edition).Tcsh users: you may have to prefix the above command with sh if you get an error message about _Unmatched "._.

The Rails Way: Painless PNG in Ruby on Rails

Philipp Mayerhofer — 2007-04-30T20:33:00+02:00

The Painless PNG plugin allows your Rails application to support PNG images with transparencies for Internet Explorer 5.5+ through 6.x without changing existing code.h2. Quick fix for the impatientFor the impatient here's the quick fix to solve your worries:

  ruby script/plugin install \
    http://svn.wheremydogs.at/painless_png/tags/painless_png

p. Yes, that's right -- it's all you have to do.The Painless PNG plugin _transparently_ supports PNG images in Ruby on Rails with the image_tag method. You don't have to change your existing code.h2. Can I see the plugin in action?Sure, we rely heavily on it at our "library of the world's finest books":http://17books.com and at our "code snippets collection":http://17snippets.com.h2. BackgroundPNG images are a blessing and a curse to web developers. They allow for high-resolution, compact graphics with beautiful transparency support. But the alpha transparency doesn't work out of the box in Internet Exploer 5.5+ and 6.x, a bane to web developers world-wide.This plugin solves the curse part and leaves only the blessing.h2. How does it work?The Painless PNG plugin monkey patches the image_tag method such that* If the browser is Internet Explorer 5.5 or 6.x then it uses the AlphaImageLoader filter method prescribed by Microsoft* For all other browsers it uses the default image_tag method from the Rails frameworkThis happens behind the scenes, transparently to your Rails application.h2. Sounds too good to be true, where's the catch?For HTML, there's none. That is, provided you've been using the image_tag method to place your images rather than hand-coding tags.The only exception is that the plugin won't work for PNG images used in CSS stylesheets.h2. Like it? Support us!The Painless PNG plugin is released under the flexible MIT License, so you can basically do what you want with provided you keep the copyright in tact.If you like and use it, we'd love to know—please drop us an email at contact@wheremydogs.at.Also, please support us by visiting and spreading the word of our "library of the world's finest books":http://17books.com and at our "code snippets collection":http://17snippets.com.h2. Problems? Found a bug?Please let us know if you experience problems using the Painless PNG or if you think you've found a bug.For us to fix any problems or bugs, please send the code you used and the exact error messages by email to philipp at wheremydogs.at.