This article is part of the series The Road to World War I .

Colonial Policy

France pursued a very ambitious colonial policy. Although it has been suggested that this policy underlay a grande imperialistic strategy — the need of an industrial country to expand its markets and secure its resources — this provides more the justification for an unpopular policy (colonialism was not universally supported by the French public opinion) than an explanation of the actual motives. It is more likely that colonialism represented an extension of French nationalism, especially after the defeat in the war with Germany (1870-1871). It was hoped that expanding the Empire would restore pride and prestige, as well as show French greatness in dire times when European diplomacy was unfavourable to her. Interestingly Bismarck supported French colonialism, as this would distract France from wounded pride over Alsace-Lorraine and thus secure peace between Germany and France.

The two main areas of interest to France were Southeast Asia and Northwest Africa (Algiers, Tunis and Morocco in particular). In Africa alone, France, during the years 1890-1910, had established and organised an Empire covering some three million square miles. In addition, considerable protectorates had been secured, for example Tonkin, China (1885). However, the achievements, as large as they may appear, should not be exaggerated - much of the land acquired was useless (as for example the Sahara Desert) or difficult to exploit for economic gain. In addition, few men and resources were invested in these areas: only some 10% of foreign investments went into the colonial Empire.

French colonialism clashed both with British expansion (resulting nearly in a war during the “Fashoda Crisis” in 1898) and with Germany’s “Weltpolitik” (exemplified by the two Moroccan Crises in 1905 and 1911). Significantly, while Anglo-French colonial disputes could be resolved and actually resulted in the wartime alliance, tensions between Germany and France increased after the both Moroccan Crises without being removed before the outbreak of war.

European Policy

The main aim of French policy in Europe was “Revanche”, i.e. the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (lost to Germany in 1871) needed to be regained, either by economic or military means.

France and Russia

However, France had been severely weakened by the war with Germany and thus needed a strong ally. This was made difficulty because a) the Bismarckian system of alliances kept France in political isolation and b) internal political differences and the humiliation suffered by the war with Germany had discredited her as an ally. Since a co-operation with Britain was unlikely (due to colonial rivalry), diplomatic relations with Russia were sought.

The failure of Germany to renew the “Reinsurance Treaty” had left Russia, like France, in a state of isolation. After initial financial agreements beginning 1891 (French loans to Russia), military discussions began to take shape. The result was the “Franco-Russian Alliance” (1894), which was primarily a defensive agreement (by which Russia would provide 700,000 to 800,000 troops if France were attacked by Germany or Italy backed by Germany and similarly France would provide 1,300,000 men if Russia were attacked either Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany). Significantly, the ideological differences between autocratic Russia and republican France had been settled in view of the common enemy, Germany.

The guarantees to Russia, especially concerning an Austrian attack, was henceforth likely to get France involved into Balkan affairs. In fact, the aftermath of the Balkan Wars showed France’s willingness to support Russia (so she would not back down again) if a similar crisis occurred, which it did when Austria invaded Serbia. Yet, the alliance committed Russia to no action concerning Alsace-Lorraine, and it is highly unlikely that Russia would have backed France in her ambitions to regain these territories by force.

France and Italy

Relations with Italy had been brought to a low point after France established a protectorate over Tunis (1881), an area in which Italy itself had historic ambitions. This was marked by Italy’s entry into the “Triple Alliance” (1882), which was primarily targeted at France. Yet, after the fall of the anti-French government as a consequence of the catastrophic disaster in Abyissinia (1896), disputes over Tunis diminished. France cleverly exploited this, and initial agreements over spheres of influence in Africa eventually resulted in an Italian guarantee to remain neutral if France were attacked by one of the other “Triple Alliance” members (1902).

The impact of arrangements with Italy should not be exaggerated. After all, she was still a member of the “Triple Alliance” and the neutrality deal with France added another possibility to Italy’s ambiguous position in European affairs.

“Rapprochement” with Great Britain

“In 1898, for all her diplomatic success elsewhere, France stood on the verge of war with Great Britain over the Fashoda crisis. In subsequent years, French hostility to British policy in South Africa, and British hostility to the policy of France’s great ally, Russia, in the Far East, scarcely promised warmer relations,” (Morris). Errors in German diplomacy, once more, changed the situation in France’s favour: “Germany’s decision to enter into naval rivalry with Britain, her tactless support for the Boers, and Britain’s own increased sense of isolation after the Boer War, all helped to provide a basis for an Anglo-French rapprochement,” (Morris).

They key for an Anglo-French understanding lay in settling colonial disputes, which resulted in the “Entente Cordial” (1904), whereby mutual concessions over influences in North Africa were agreed upon (France respected Britain’s predominance in Egypt and Britain conceded a “free hand” to France in Morocco).

“Rapprochement” meant a remarkable turn in Anglo-French relations - the archenemies had entered a new era of cordiality and new tensions between the powers did, notably, not arise until the outbreak of war.

However, it should be noted that the agreement contained no military understandings whatsoever and subsequent military discussions led to no results. It was, furthermore, highly unlikely that Britain were to back France in her attempts to regain Alsace-Lorraine. It did, though, greatly improve Anglo-French relations. Indeed, it was Germany’s growth combined with her imperialistic demands (as during the two Moroccan Crisis) and her continued naval expansion that furthered Anglo-French relations and eventually even drew Britain and Russia together, thereby creating the “Triple Entente” (1907).

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