This article is part of the series The Road to World War I .

Foreign policy under Bismarck

Germany under Bismarck

Following the war with France (1870-1871), Bismarck was eager to keep France politically isolated to prevent her from a) re-capturing the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and b) creating the “nightmare coalition” (a Franco-Russian Alliance) that would force Germany to lead a two-front war. Colonial disputes made an Anglo-French agreement unlikely and consequently Bismarck sought relations with Russia and Austria-Hungary to secure peace in Europe.

The Dreikaiserbund

Bismarck’s policies lead to the “Dreikaiserbund” (1872) - primarily a defensive arrangement - by which any of the three powers would be given support if attacked by a fourth power.

For Bismarck, it has been suggested, there were three motives to signing this treaty: it a) provided a natural front of conservative ideals against disruptive forces such as nationalism (from the Balkans) and socialism (from France), b) ensured that neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary would ally with France and c) “it’s objective,” A.J.P. Taylor wrote, “in so far as it had one, was to prevent a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Eastern question.”

The conclusion of the League of the Three Emperors, however, “gave a false air of stability to the politics of Eastern Europe. Behind its façade, a series of factors kept alive Russian resentment at rising German power and at Austria pretensions in the Balkans,” (Morris). The “Congress of Berlin” (1878), which limited Russia from her gains in Turkey and gave Austria the right to govern the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, struck a blow to Russo-German relations and revealed the prevailing hostility between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. The measure of tension is best illustrated by the refusal of Alexander III (he regarded the Congress as, “a European coalition against Russia”) to renew the “Dreikaiserbund” (April 1887).

The Dual Alliance

It was more the wounded pride and the rejection of Russian pan-slav ambitions after the Congress of Berlin that caused the Anti-German feeling in Russia rather than a re-orientation of German foreign policy.

Bismarck’s motives for signing the treaty are complex, yet he was a) faced with the threat of political isolation, b) hoped to frighten Russia back into better terms and c) certain that a commitment to Austria would be popular within Germany especially in times when Bismarck heavily relied on conservative support.

The resulting “Dual Alliance” between Austria and Germany was essentially a defensive agreement by which either country would give full support to the other if attacked by Russia or a country aided by Russia, and at least remain neutral in case if either were attacked by any other power. Italy was added to this arrangement, thereby creating the “Triple Alliance” (1882), as she had felt threatened by the recent French invasion of Tunis and believed this the response to (future) French aggression.

The understandings with Italy provided Germany for the first time with a committed ally against France. The arrangements with Austria, however, were now likely to get Germany involved into Balkan affairs, areas of no direct interests to her. This is exemplified by German intervention in the Bosnian Crisis (1908), the “Balkan Wars” (1912-1913) and, eventually, the war following the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand (1914).

The Reinsurance Treaty

After Russia had forced the abdication of the independent-minded Bulgarian King Alexander (1886), a Russo-Austrian clash seemed more likely than ever and the “Dreikaiserbund” finally collapsed.

With his policy at stake, Bismarck turned to Russia and concluded the secret “Reinsurance Treaty” (1887). Both powers agreed benevolent neutrality if attacked by a third power, provided Russia did not attack Austria (in which case Germany would be tied to her ally) or Germany attacked France.

It has often been suggested that the “Reinsurance Treaty” was in fact incompatible with Germany’s promises to Austria given in the “Dual Alliance”. However, there was no contradiction between the terms of the two agreements. The two treaties, as a matter of fact, gave Germany the possibility to arbitrate in the event of a clash on who was truly the aggressor and whom she would support. Furthermore, it made a French attack improbable, as alone she would be in a too weak position to challenge Germany.

German Foreign Policy after Bismarck

The abandonment of the Reinsurance Treaty and the Franco-Russian Alliance

Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck had broken on the renewal of the “Reinsurance Treaty”, which had guaranteed that a French re-capturing of Alsace-Lorraine could not become reality. To Bismarck, the treaty had provided a peace in Europe by the assurance of Russian and German neutrality. Wilhelm, however, believed a) the alliance was incompatible with the promises given to Austria in the “Dual Alliance”, b) the Treaty terms gave more advantages to Russia than to Germany and c) that war in Europe would most likely be of Germany against France, or Russia against Austria - and in any case, Russia and Germany could not be on the same side.

Consequently, the “Reinsurance Treaty”, despite Russian offers, was not renewed (1890).

The almost immediate consequence was a Franco-Russian economic understanding (1891) that eventually ended in the “nightmare coalition” Bismarck had so desparately sought to avoid — the “Franco-Russian Alliance” (1894).

This in turn meant that in the event of war, Germany would now need to fight on two fronts. This, in addition with the renewal of the “Triple Alliance” with Austria and Italy (1891) gave a, “substantial contribution to the formation of hostile camps in Europe that eventually undermined the peace,” (Morris). Europe was thus now split into two camps, with only Britain left out of the alliance network.

Furthermore, any Balkan affair was now likely to get both France and Germany involved. This is especially true of the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars - after which Russia only backed down after German intervention threats of mobilisation and France henceforth committed herself to support Russia - as well as the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, after which France and Germany committed themselves to support their allies.

European policy

The primary aim of German foreign policy in Europe was to manoeuvre the alliance system into her favour as this would a) give protection against a possible future attack of France and b) assure support in her ambitions for “Weltpolitik”.

Events in the nineteenth century, however, had shown that a) France would remain Germany’s enemy and b) Austria her ally. Relations with Britain and Russia were thus of great significance.

Germany and Russia

Efforts were made to dislodge Russia from her alliance with France by keeping up friendly relations. Common action against recent Japanese gains from China during the 1890’s seemed prosperous, but the consequent Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) let the damage done by the cancellation of the Reinsurance Treaty reappear (although the Russian distractions from European affairs due to the war suited Germany, it made Russia believe that it had been Germany’s goal all along).

In a meeting at Björkö (July 1905), the Kaiser persuaded the Tsar to sign a treaty which guaranteed mutual aid if either country were attacked by a second power. To Germany, it meant that she would be relieved of a two-war front and of a possible French attack; to Nicholas II it provided a chance to gain friends while his position at home was at stake (due to political unrest, i.e. the 1905 revolution).

It was soon realised, however, that the treaties were incompatible to both Germany and Russia due to commitments to their respective allies, Austria and France. Russia proposed France to be excluded, yet, as this would in fact destroy the whole intention of the treaty (i.e. German intentions to dislodge Russia from France), it was never ratified.

Germany and Britain

A response to the growing Russo-French menace would have been attempts to improve relations with Britain. Yet, the Kaiser’s attitude to Britain remained, in a word, ambiguous. He both “loved and loathed” Britain, i.e. on the one hand he wanted a friendly relationship to Britain and on the other hand he desired to convince her people of his own countries strength.

In 1896, for example, he sent a telegram to the Boer President, Kruger, and congratulated him on successfully defeating the Jameson Raid, “without for the help of friendly powers” This was, obviously, targeted at Britain and caused discontent in British public opinion. In a “Daily Telegraph” interview in 1908, on the other hand, Wilhelm gloated how he had actually helped the British defeat the Boers. Colonial agreements over Heligoland and East Africa (1890) contrasted to the Kaiser’s proposal to Nicholas for a joined alliance against further British expansion (1897).

This ambivalent attitude is probably explained by Wilhelm’s intentions to show Britain how crucial Germany’s friendship was for Britain’s survival and thus “frighten” them into an alliance. Before 1900, this idea actually seemed to prosper: an Anglo-German colonial agreement was suggested (1898), but was rejected as Germany was a) worried it would stress relations with Russia for no reason and b) convinced that Britain was only seeking allies against Russian expansion in the Far East.

After the turn of the century, British unpopularity over the Boer War (1899-1900) and German influence in Turkey made an Anglo-German unlikely. A second approach (January 1901) was rejected as Germany was in the belief that an alliance with her was Britain’s only option and consequently set strict conditions on alliance: Britain was to tie herself not only to Germany but to the “Triple Alliance” as a whole. Britain rejected this proposal as she was unwilling to commit herself to the maintenance of Austria.

Failure to reach agreement with Britain had significant impacts on German foreign policy.

Given Italy’s ambivalent role (after her guarantees to France to remain neutral if France were attacked by one of the other “Triple Alliance” members) and the formation of the “Triple Entente” (1907) between Britain, France and Russia, it meant that Germany was now wholly dependent on Austria as an ally. This in turn implied that she would henceforth be involved in Balkan disputes, as exemplified by the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars.

The naval building remained the last effort to “force” Britain into a co-operation, and in fact had the opposite effect of irreparably souring Anglo-German relations and destroying possibilities of an agreement with a nation that might have been a natural ally of Germany.

Weltpolitik

“Weltpolitik” was essentially a response to internal German developments. For one, the rapidly growing German industry and population left Germany in a state to decide whether to expand beyond her boundaries (and to secure industrial resources and markets) or to stagnate as a major power. Secondly, following the rapid growth of German economy combined with her dominant role in European affairs, an increased feeling in the national sense of power appeared. Thirdly and lastly, it gave the possibility to distract from internal political divisions, such as the opposition from the Social Democrats.

Especially three leagues in Germany showed the contribution of nationalism to German foreign policy. The “German Colonial League” encouraged the acquisition of colonies; the “Pan German League” furthered an increase in arms and the promotion of German strength within and outside of Europe; the “German Navy League” called for a larger navy.

The leagues reflected very much national feelings that Germany was to have a more dominant role in world affairs. This was essentially “Weltpolitik”: Wilhelm II desired to make Germany a dominant world power, i.e. to have a say in world affairs and in his own words summarised Weltpolitik, stating, “nothing must henceforth be settled in the world without the intervention of Germany and the German Emperor.”

“Weltpolitik” was, in a sense, an attempt to solve and distract from domestic problems by uniting the country behind the Kaiser. In any case, “Weltpolitik” became a dominating factor in German foreign policy.

In order for “Weltpolitik” to be achieved, military, economic and political expansion was required, as requested by the leagues. Political and economic expansion required the acquisition of colonies, which in turn implied that an increase in arms, especially the navy, was essential to secure these colonies. In addition, the military power could, if not to be used, at least exist as a threat to put more weight on Germany’s role in international affairs.

Manifestations of “Weltpolitik”

“Weltpolitik” manifested itself wherever areas where open to European penetration. In Africa, protectorates had been declared over East Africa, South West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland. These were, though, minimal compared to British and French acquisitions.

German relations with the Ottoman Empire were more prosperous. Plans to build a Berlin-Baghdad railway were potentially profitable yet were equally more likely to precipitate international disputes. Although the Turkish government had agreed with the “Deutsche Bank” to finance the project linking Baghdad with the Persian Gulf, it was a region of vital interest to both Russia and Britain.

Consequences

As a whole, the physical gains of colonial expansion were rather poor as a) the colonial empire amounted only to some one million square miles, b) merely some 505 million marks were invested in total and c) the colonies were dispersed around the globe and thus indefensible and vulnerable to attack (as shown by the war).

It did, though, contribute to international tensions and paved the way for Germany’s path to political isolation and encirclement.

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