The Road to World War I: The Second Moroccan Crisis

This article is part of the series The Road to World War I .

A new opportunity for Germany

In May 1911, the French occupied Fez, a major city, to quell a rebellion against the Sultan and to protect European citizens in Morocco.

German Reactions

Kaiser Wilhelm strongly protested, claiming the French were preparing to establish an overall protectorate. The gunboat “Panther” was sent to Agadir to object to French supremacy.

Germany’s intentions

The opportunity was good to humiliate France and demonstrate German strength by claiming compensation for the French “take-over”. By doing so, Britain could be made aware of her weak ally, France, especially as Anglo-Russian relations were already strained (due to colonial rivalries) and the “Triple Entente” seemed to be disintegrating. Possibly, Kaiser Wilhelm also had hopes of establishing a naval base in that area.

Subsequent Talks

German demands for compensation in exchange for accepting French domination in Morocco were agreed upon. France was to have free hand and Morocco actually became a French protectorate (1912). Germany received parts of French Congo and two areas connecting the Cameroons to Congo and Ubangi.

Consequences

The arrival of the “Panther” threatened the British into believing a further expansion of the German navy in the form of a naval base and was also regarded as a very hostile act (especially for the British, who saw it as a direct threat for her colony at Gibraltar). Consequently, Anglo-German relations were gravely soured and actually furthered the already existing Naval Race.

Thus, Anglo-French relations were further strengthened and now, for the first time, resulted in a military co-operation, the naval agreement in 1912 (by which the British would transfer her ships from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and French from Brest to the Mediterranean). Although it did not result in a formal alliance, it showed British awareness of a German threat.

The Second Moroccan Crisis put an end to all hopes of improving Franco-German relations and France was now convinced that Germany was hostile towards her. It should be noted that, “there followed a distinct revival in nationalist feeling and hostility [in France] towards Germany. Despite their alliances, France never actually sought war with Germany, which they might have done in 1908 or 1911. However, between 1912 and 1914 extensive preparations were made. Military parades, […] were revived, the high command reorganised, military aircraft developed and, in 1913, the military protocol with Russia signed (by which both powers should mobilise if either were attack by Germany ‘without there being the need for preliminary agreement’),” (Wolfson). On the outbreak of war, thus, France had never been readier (though not for the type of warfare that followed).

Furthermore, Germany suffered a severe diplomatic defeat, similar to the Russian one during the Bosnian Crisis, and would not be prepared to back down again. The crisis caused tension in Europe that was not removed until the outbreak of war.

Subsequently, Italy, following the French principle, was eager to extend her own influence in North Africa and resulted in an unprovoked attack on the Turkish possession of Tripoli. Turkey was forced to stretch her resources and this provided an opportunity for the Balkan states to rid themselves of Turkish rule, hence the Balkan Wars.

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