What evidence is there to support the view that “Russia’s control over Europe east of the ‘iron curtain’ was never complete”?

Was Russia’s control over Europe east of the Iron Curtain ever complete?

Already during Stalin’s days, one country that was included as being east of the Iron Curtain in Churchill’s famous speech¹, had resisted Soviet domination. Unlike the other Eastern European countries, Tito and his partisans had freed Yugoslavia from Nazi occupation (during World War Two) without much help from the Red Army. Tito’s enraged Stalin when he unilaterally dispatched troops to Albania to protect the country from a Greek civil war, and when he pursued a federation with Bulgaria, again without Soviet consultation. The split between Tito and Stalin demonstrated that an Eastern Europe country could openly resist Soviet rule. Yugoslavia’s subsequent expulsion from the Cominform² was intended by Stalin to isolate her and force Tito to resign. However, Tito’s popularity with his people was anchored too deeply and Yugoslavia appealed successfully to the West for help. Yugoslava had successfully resisted Soviet domination.

East Germany was the first country to come out in open protest after Stalin’s death. In East Berlin, 100,000 workers set out to demonstrate for better wages³. Although the riots were dispersed by Russian tanks, they nevertheless proved that, with Stalin gone, a country was prepared to openly protest to Soviet rule.

To secure her control over Eastern Europe, solving economic problems (that is, rebuilding after the war) and binding these countries to the Soviet communist society would be of vital importance. The economic question became urgent when the “Marshall Plan”⁴ was issued by the United States, offering financial aid to European countries. The Soviet Union rejected what it called “dollar imperialism” and banned Eastern European states from receiving Marshall aid. Instead, the Soviet Union formed the Comecon⁵, intended to counter the “Marshall Plan” and to secure Russian domination over Eastern Europe. Similarly by intent was the “Warsaw Pact”, created 1955, binding the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union militarily. It should be noted that this was the response to the German entry into NATO⁶. The Comecon and the Warsaw Pact highlighted Soviet attempts to secure and control Eastern Europe by economic and military means. Also, it showed that the USSR knew that a healthy economy was vital to maintain control over Europe east of the Iron Curtain. It would be economic discontent that sparked the uprising in Eastern Europe and lead to the downfall of the Soviet Union.

The rise of Krushchev as the Soviet leader meant a further turning point for Russian relations with her eastern satellites. With his policy of De-stalinisation - manifested in his “Secret Speech” at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU⁷ - and, more significantly, his easing of tensions with Tito’s Yugoslavia (illustrated by two visits during 1955-1956), proved to be an “invitation” to the satellite states. The message they perceived was that the Soviet Union had accepted Yugoslavia’s claims to develop her own type of communism. If it applied to Yugoslavia, why should it not apply to them too? The results were independence movements, in particular in Poland and Hungary, throughout the year of 1956.

In Poland, riots broke out at Poznan⁸. The motives were, though, initially not political. The weakening of the economic situation had provoked the workers to protest against the declining living standards and to demonstrate against wage restriction and high taxes. It was, more significantly, the long tradition of anti-Russian hostility that turned this uprising into a massive anti-government and essentially anti-Russian demonstration. Though Soviet tanks crushed the rebellion, Krushchev agreed that Gomulka, a popular leader who had been imprisoned under Stalin for “Titoism”, should be allowed to reassume office as First Secretary of the party. Furthermore, Krushchev permitted Polish communism to develop in its own way, provided Poland would remain loyal to the “Warsaw Pact”. It was, above all, Polish guarantees to remain loyal to the “Warsaw Pact” that hindered further Soviet involvement in Poland (up until the 1980s).

Hungary, similarly, saw her chances for revision and, perhaps, more independence from Soviet influence after Krushchev’s “Secret Speech”. It should be noted, though, that the Soviet Union, treated Hungary, unlike Poland, as a defeated power (as she had been a satellite ally of Nazi Germany) and thus demanded large reparations sums. Rakosi, a hard-line Stalinist, had ruled Hungary as First Secretary of the Communist Party under Stalin’s days. His rule was very repressive: the AVO⁹ ruthlessly oppressed political opponents and the remaining stationed Russian troops served as a reminder of Soviet domination. Imre Nagy, who, like Gomulka, had been rejected under Stalin, replaced Rakosi as result of “de-stalinisation”. Nagy issued some moderate reforms, such as allowing some peasants to leave the collective farms, turning the economy away from heavy industry and more to services, the press was allowed more freedom and some political prisoners were released. However, Rakosi was able to overthrow Nagy and again became Prime Minister¹⁰. Hatred against the repressive regime grew, living standards declined, anti-Russian feeling increased and Krushchev’s speech stimulated desire for more independence - these factors contributed decisively to the uprising in October 1956. Soviet reactions were to put pressure on Rakosi, who, on the pretext of “illhealth”, resigned in October 1956 and ceded his office once more to Nagy. This did not, however, decrease the rioting. On the contrary, Nagy furthered the situation by ending the one-party system and declaring Hungary’s withdrawal from the “Warsaw Pact”. To Krushchev, the latter was the deciding factor to take action. China, who saw the Hungarian revolt as a threat to the communist system and believed Hungary would serve as the falling domino, had put Krushchev under pressure to act. Even more, Krushchev’s position was insecure and the presidential elections in the USA as well as the “Suez Crisis” distracted world attention. Thus, with Soviet military security at stake, Russian troops invaded Hungary¹¹. In two weeks of bitter fighting, the Russians crushed the revolt with a death toll of 50,000 Hungarians and 7,000 Russians and further 180,000 Hungarian refugees fled to Austria. Kadar was appointed by the Soviets as the new premier and Nagy, falsely guaranteed safe conduct, was arrested and executed.

In Czechoslovakia, there was considerable opposition to Soviet rule and the old-Stalinist Novotny, President and First Secretary of the communist party. The reasons were several: the Czechs were industrially and culturally the most developed of the Eastern bloc, thus objected to the over-centralised Russian control of their economy and rejected the censorship in the press and freedom of speech. Consequently, Novotny was voted out of office and Dubczek seized the office of Premier¹². He introduced a number of reforms and initiated what became known as the “Prague Spring”. Freedom of speech and press was allowed, the right to travel abroad was granted, judicial reforms were carried out and it was permitted to “question” the communist party - this “Action Programme” was what Dubczek called, “socialism with a human face”. Meanwhile, the USSR was becoming worried that the reforms might threaten communist rule in Czechoslovakia, hence possible other Eastern European countries - thus being a threat to her own security. Dubczek, knowing of the Hungarian mistakes, repeatedly assured the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia would remain loyal to the communist society and the “Warsaw Pact”. Soviet worries were reflected in the “Warsaw Letter”¹³, signed by all the “Warsaw Pact” members except Czechoslovakia, in which these countries expressed their concerns over recent reforms in Czechoslovakia. Isolated from the socialist bloc, Dubczek again assured loyalty to the communist society. Nevertheless, Soviet fears that this newly won freedom might spread onto other Eastern European countries provoked intervention, and “Warsaw Pact” troops (Russian, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian that is) invaded Czechoslovakia. This unexpected act was condemned as hostile and deemed unnecessary by both non-communists and communists in Czechoslovakia. Dubczek was forced to restore censorship. The initial passive resistance turned into active protest when in January 1969 Jan Palach burned himself in protest to Soviet intervention. The victory of Czechoslovakia against Russia in the finals at the ice hockey world championships the same year was seen as symbolic and riots broke out in Prague. Consequently, the revolt was crushed and Dubczek, along with his reforms, was removed. Husak, a pro-Moscow communist, was appointed as the new leader.

In 1970 the attention turned once more to Poland. Economic discontent initiated strikes and riots, and forced Gomulka, who had lost his popularity, to resign and Gierek was appointed as the new leader. In 1976, these demonstrations were lit up again as heavy debts with the Western world had lead to food shortages. As the situation did not improve, Gierek was forced to resign. Faced with the same problems as in 1976, that is, the poor economic conditions combined with the large debts and the food shortages, the strikes were furthered. At the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk workers formed “Solidarity”¹⁴, initially a trade union that eventually turned into a nation-wide political movement, demanding freedom of speech and assembly, as well as the right to strike. The election of a Polish pope, John Paul II, in 1978 played its part in raising the strong catholic element in “Solidarity” and provided opposition to the communists. In December 1981, after the opposition had grown considerably, Martial Law was declared by General Jaruzelski, the newly appointed leader, which suspended civil rights and introduced a curfew. The army took command and telephone lines were cut to block communication between “Solidarity”. In 1982, “Solidarity” was banned and suppressed, which was a fairly difficult task, considering that the membership had mounted to some 10 million, and its leader, Lech Walesa, was put under arrest. The murder of Father Popieluszko in 1984 by the Z.O.M.O.¹⁵ caused a public and international outcry. Clearly, “Solidarity” was as much an oppositional group to the government as it was to the Soviet, communist domination. That its membership consisted of a large proportion of the population is self-explanatory and undermines the claim that Soviet domination of Europe east of the “iron curtain” was never fully complete.

In fact, the crises situation in Eastern Europe all demonstrate that there was opposition to Soviet rule and that the domination she had seeked to secure by the “Comecon” and the “Warsaw Pact” which were essentially the causes for these uprisings, had failed. Up until the appointment of Gorbachev as Communist Party Secretary in the USSR (1985) and his policy of “Glasnost and Perestroika”¹⁶ did the move towards democracy in Eastern Europe begin and the Soviet “grip” over these countries to fade. The control was finally abandoned with the dissolution of the “Warsaw Pact” in 1991.

¹ In his famous Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, USA, 1946

² 1948

³ 1953

⁴ 1948

⁵ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, formed in 1949

⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, defensive alliance aimed at the USSR

⁷ February 1956

⁸ June 1956

⁹ State Protection Group - secret police

¹⁰ 1955

¹¹ November 3, 1956

¹² January 1968

¹³ July 1968

¹⁴ 1980

¹⁵ secret police

¹⁶ “openness” and “economic and social reform