After the early stages of the year it seemed unlikely that anybody could stop the advance of the German Wehrmacht, guided by its modern, mechanised infantry and its superior Blitzkrieg¹ tactics. How then, did the sure seeming victory turn into the gradual defeat of Hitler’s Third Reich?

The epic Battle of Britain was to be the first setback for Hitler. Although he never desired to attack Britain - after the fall of France he falsely believed she would negotiate for peace - Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain was launched². The Luftwaffe enjoyed numerical superiority over the RAF, and at first it seemed as though the bombing of shipping, coastal ports, airfields and factories would force Britain to her knees. Indeed, the Germans did not know just how close they were to victory. The situation changed when Allied planes bombed Berlin: Hitler had previously boasted about the invulnerability of the Reich capital and ordered vengeance. The Luftwaffe now switched its targets to London and provincial cities in the Southeast. This was decisive: the RAF had time to reorganise and shift its personnel and this, added to the superiority of their fighters and the effective usage of radar technology to spot German bombing raids, enabled Britain to stay in the war. The survival of Britain was significant for various reasons: for one, it meant a serious testing of the German army, secondly, it brought the USA, seeing more and more a threat in German expansion, closer to Britain and thirdly, it would provide a possible spring-board for future invasions. Morris comments on the Battle of Britain as a, “first checking of Germanys military triumphant progress”, as well as an, “overstretching of her [Germanys] military resources that was to be her downfall³”.

It is difficult to determine to what extent the help from Britain’s invisible ally, the USA, decided the Battle of Britain. As a matter of fact, the United States had followed a policy of isolation after the First World War and the intent to maintain neutral in the case of another war was clearly reflected in the Neutrality Acts⁴. Yet, Britain was reluctant on American trade and its credit. The initial cash-and-carry⁵ system was short-lived as credits were soon used up. The pro-British policy, enhanced by the personal friendship between Churchill and Roosevelt, resulted first in the Destroyer Deal⁶ and later in the Lend-Lease⁷ arrangement. It is arguable whether or not the American aid decisively changed the Battle of Britain and hence the outcome of the war. Needless to say that the destroyers surely enabled a safer passage for the vital cargo supplied by the merchant ships⁸, of which again the trade, as well as the war materials helped feed the population and strengthened the army.

The more decisive change, however, arrived with the official entry of the USA into war. Following the surprise raid at Pearl Harbour⁹ and the American declaration of war on Japan - an Axis Ally - Hitler, hoping Japan would attack Russia and thus relieve the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, declared war on the United States¹⁰. The power balance now clearly shifted to the allied side and, on the long run, with the two world’s industrial powers and Britain, with all their resources and manpower on the opposing side, Germanys defeat was inevitable. Alan Bullock regarded Hitler’s declaration of war against the USA as, “the greatest single mistake of the career”.

The first major defeat came during the North Africa Campaign. Rommel, commander of the German Africa Corps, became notorious for his strategic planning. With his forces he came right up to El Alamein¹¹, where he was, however, driven back after failing twice to break the British line of defence. Chased by the Eighth Army and finally encircled after the landing of Anglo-American troops in Morocco, the Corps surrendered¹². The failing in North Africa meant the first real defeat for the Wehrmacht in the war and deprived Germany of valuable resources, such as oil. Furthermore, it now gave a springboard for an invasion of southern Europe.

Although the invasion of Italy was attempted¹³, German forces resisted a breakthrough further north. Political changes, the suspension of Mussolini that is, brought about the armistice with the Allies. This relieved them of all Italian forces, fighting on basically all Axis fronts, added to the fact that twenty-six German divisions were captured. The contribution of this remains disputed. Although the additional troops would have helped to hold the advancing Red Army, the eventual outcome was hardly affected. Summarising, the Battle of El Alamein and consequently the invasion of Italy were helpful, but by no means decisive.

Already at the dawn of his political career, Hitler clarified his intention to create Lebensraum¹⁴ in the East. This ideology and his hatred against communism made it obvious that some day he would attack Russia. When, however, Mussolini was coming close to a humiliating defeat in Greece, Hitler saw himself forced to help out. The commitment of twenty-eight divisions proved a costly side-show. Even more, Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, was postponed by six weeks. Six weeks more time before winter would break out; six less weeks for Stalin to prepare for what was inevitable. It is arguable to what extent this handicap influenced the outcome of the war, but for sure, with more time and troops available, war efforts would have gone far more efficient on the Eastern Front.

Nevertheless, the invasion of Russia was launched¹⁵. Initial successes seemed to justify the optimistic views that the campaign would be over within eight weeks. It might appear simplistic to say that any two (or more) front war can, in the long term, only lead to defeat, or that any invasion of Russia is doomed to failure. Yet, the Great War had already shown the enormous strains of a two-front war. And considering that Russia is such a large, vast country, and with the support of the winter, which had already helped to defeat Napoleons army, the operation seemed a suicide mission.

Although the Germans were still advancing, it seemed as though the tide was gradually turning on the Eastern Front. Leningrad, defended by soldiers and civilians, did not fall, the infamous winter - in which the warm-equipped Wehrmacht now faced a second fierce enemy - arrived sooner than expected and, even more, the civilians were ordered to scorch the earth¹⁶ as the Germans penetrated deeper into the heart of Russia. And yet, the real setback came at the Battle of Stalingrad¹⁷. The Red Army encircled the entire German Sixth Army¹⁸ while it was attacking the city, and despite orders from Hitler not to retreat or surrender, the commander of the army, von Paulus, and the remaining eighty thousand men eventually capitulated. Nathaniel Harris writes, “If there was such a thing as a turning point in the course of the Second World War, it was Stalingrad. The USSR would survive, and in time the Allies would win¹⁹”. The Wehrmacht and with it its invincible reputation, had suffered a humiliating and costly (in terms of material and manpower) defeat. Added to that, the forces further south were forced to retreat in fear of being encircled. From then on, the German Army pursued a constant retreat.

Although the United States had already entered the war in 1941, it was not until 1944, until their real effectiveness came into action in Europe. On D-Day²⁰, an invasion force of Allied troops landed on the Normandy beachhead, an area where the Germans had little expected an attack. With the help of Mulberry Harbours²¹ and amphibious tanks, the Allies managed to establish a foothold in Fortress Europe. Now, there was a true two-front war, and the defeat of Germany was only a question of time.

There remains no doubt that Hitler’s decisions contributed largely to the eventual defeat of Germany. His orders to switch the main targets from airfields and factories to cities definitely gave Britain the necessary air to breathe and to survive during the Battle of Britain. Similarly, the invasion of Russia marked the gradual defeat. Although the Wehrmacht advanced, the invasion of Russia would ultimately change the outcome of the war. His rapid success had made him incautious and arrogant: he under-estimated both the British and Russian resistance.

Simpler than that, one could discuss that the inability to invade Britain, or at least eliminating her before risking and invasion of Russia, was the eventual deciding factor. In the hypothetical situation of Britain having been invaded, it is highly unlikely that the USA could have contributed so significantly to the outcome of the war, in the sense of sending supplies, providing war materials and later help launch D-Day from the southern British coast.

On the other hand again, one could argue that the Red Army could have won the war by itself, that is, without D-Day. The industrial plants of the Soviet Union were cleverly shifted to the untouched East and as the war proceeded, the output of war materials and men would sooner or later simply sweep over the Wehrmacht. This would, once again, pinpoint Hitler’s decision to invade Russia as primarily fatal. This prediction, however, would have been worthless with the fall of Stalingrad and Leningrad (consequently meaning the probable surrender of the Soviet Union), clearly showing the importance of both these battles to the outcome of the war. Yet, the Allied landings did relieve the Eastern Front, where two-thirds of the Wehrmacht had been fighting. Attacking Russia was, in hindsight, one of the decisive mistakes Hitler made. Not eliminating Britain before was the other.

Bibliography:

• Years of Change - European History 1890-1945, by Robert Wolfson
• European History 1848-1945, by TA Morris
• Spotlight on the Second World War, by Nathaniel Harris

Footnotes:

1 Air raids followed by ground attacks through infantry and fast tanks

2 July 1940

3 European History 1848-1945, by T A Morris

4 1935, 1936, 1937

5 instant pay

6 The Americans gave 50 destroyers in exchange for the use of British Naval Bases in the Pacific

7 American loans regardless of credits - this was, in fact, later on also extended also to Russia

8 the Germans were sinking merchant ships with their wolf packs of U-boats

9 December 7, 1941

10 December 11, 1941

11 70 miles to the west of Alexandria, Egypt

12 May 1943

13 July 10, 1943

14 living space

15 June 22, 1941; altogether 3,500,000 soldiers were used

16 Basically to render all resources unusable - the Wehrmacht had to be supplied over longer and more difficult routes

17 November 1942-February 1943

18 initially 300,000

19 Spotlight on the Second World War, by Nathaniel Harris

20 June 6, 1944

21 mobile docks

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